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Judgment and Decision Making

Judgment and Decision Making

Annual Review of Psychology

Vol. 71:331-355 (Volume publication date January 2020)
First published as a Review in Advance on July 23, 2019
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-050747

Baruch Fischhoff¹ and Stephen B. Broomell²

¹Department of Engineering and Public Policy, and Institute for Politics and Strategy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213, USA; email: [email protected]

²Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213, USA; email: [email protected]

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Sections

• Abstract
• Keywords
• INTRODUCTION
• JUDGMENT
• PREFERENCES
• CHOICE
• INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
• LIFE SPAN
• APPLICATIONS
• COST, RISK, AND BENEFIT ANALYSES
• CONCLUSION
• SUMMARY POINTS
• FUTURE ISSUES
• disclosure statement
• literature cited

Abstract

The science of judgment and decision making involves three interrelated forms of research: analysis of the decisions people face, description of their natural responses, and interventions meant to help them do better. After briefly introducing the field's intellectual foundations, we review recent basic research into the three core elements of decision making: judgment, or how people predict the outcomes that will follow possible choices; preference, or how people weigh those outcomes; and choice, or how people combine judgments and preferences to reach a decision. We then review research into two potential sources of behavioral heterogeneity: individual differences in decision-making competence and developmental changes across the life span. Next, we illustrate applications intended to improve individual and organizational decision making in health, public policy, intelligence analysis, and risk management. We emphasize the potential value of coupling analytical and behavioral research and having basic and applied research inform one another.

INTRODUCTION

Behavioral decision research arose as psychology's contribution to a remarkable period in which scientists and scholars from diverse disciplines collaborated in pursuing issues raised by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) in their landmark volume on rational choice theory. In a seminal article and a subsequent Annual Review of Psychology article, Edwards (1954, 1961) framed the field's fundamental commitment to studying the properties of tasks, as presented by life or by researchers, in tandem with studying individuals' responses to them. The present review emphasizes the integrative strategy of those groundbreaking works and its contribution to interventions designed to help people navigate worlds that can be unfamiliar, uncertain, unintuitive, and unfriendly.

Early descriptive research focused on highly structured tasks amenable to analysis that identified optimal, or rational, behavior. Those studies revealed important regularities, such as individuals' lack of insight into their own decision-making processes and their tendency to extract too much information from some observations and too little from others. However, the research also revealed limits to such tasks, summarized in what proved to be a terminal review of two prominent early research programs (Slovic & Lichtenstein 1971). One of those programs used multiple regression to model repeated decisions (e.g., evaluating graduate school applicants based on a common set of attributes). Although those models often had predictive value, they could not distinguish among competing psychological accounts (Jaccard 2012). The second of those research programs used stylized Bayesian tasks (e.g., assessing the probability that an urn contained 70% blue balls, rather than 70% red ones, based on a sequence of draws). Although those studies revealed much about experimental design, their tasks lacked the realism needed to engage natural processes.

Recognizing these limitations opened the door to research programs that allowed richer expressions of behavior and deeper understanding of the processes producing it, while still being grounded in task analysis. One such program is the study of judgment heuristics, informed by Bayesian analysis of the biases that they can produce (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). A second is the study of orderly but nonrational choice processes, informed by utility theory analyses of the inconsistent preferences that they produce (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). A third is the study of cognitive capabilities, informed by modeling procedures that accommodate properties of people and tasks (Karelaia & Hogarth 2008, Lieder et al. 2018). A propelling force in these developments has been the adoption of more diverse research methods, including ones that can reveal when people view tasks very differently than researchers imagine (Medin et al. 2017).

Our review begins with basic research into the three essential elements of decision making: judgment, predicting the outcomes of choosing possible options; preference, weighing the importance of those outcomes; and choice, combining judgments and preferences to make decisions. That research asks how people, in general, behave. The next two sections describe research into two potential sources of behavioral heterogeneity: individual differences and life-span developmental changes in decision-making competence. The article then illustrates interventions designed to improve individual and organizational decision making. The concluding section describes the field's potentially productive tension between relatively stable analytical methods and ever-changing empirical results.

JUDGMENT

Sound decisions require predicting what will happen if different choices are made. The quality of those judgments can be evaluated in terms of their accuracy or their consistency. Studies of both accuracy and consistency build on analytical research formalizing these criteria. Achieving one goal need not mean achieving the other. People may have accurate beliefs about one topic but not about related ones, leading to inconsistent judgments; or they may have consistent beliefs but know very little. Both criteria continue to be central topics in behavioral decision research, or decision science, as the field is sometimes called.

Accuracy

How accurately people understand their world has been studied in several ways, each with strengths and weaknesses, as discussed below.

Knowledge (how much people know).

The simplest way to evaluate how much people know is by asking them to answer factual questions. Literacy tests represent a domain (e.g., health, finance, science) with a fixed set of such questions. For example, a widely used test of science literacy asks, "True or false? The center of the Earth is very hot" (Natl. Sci. Board 2014, p. 7.23). There are many such tests. However, the selection of their items is rarely based on an analysis of what people need to know. As a result, even when scores on literacy tests predict behavior, they typically offer limited insight into how individuals acquire their knowledge or use it. Perhaps knowing the specific facts on a test helps people to make better decisions; perhaps it predicts their knowledge of other, more relevant facts; or perhaps it reflects education or test-taking ability.

A decision science approach to assessing knowledge begins by analyzing the facts needed to make specific decisions. Sometimes, people need to know just a few summary estimates, such as the risks and benefits of a medical treatment. A knowledge test for those facts might ask people to estimate the probabilities of possible outcomes (Schwartz & Woloshin 2013, Zikmund-Fisher 2019). Sometimes people need to know how things work, for example, what determines their risk of HIV/AIDS. A knowledge test for those facts might ask about how the virus can be transmitted. Such mental models of the processes determining the outcomes of decisions have been studied for domains as diverse as HIV/AIDS, climate change, contraceptives, energy consumption, pandemics, and radon (Bruine de Bruin & Bostrom 2013). Von Winterfeldt (2013) illustrates how decisions are analyzed, looking at whether to turn a baby in the breech position. Fischhoff et al. (2006) illustrate how processes are analyzed, looking at how a pandemic could unfold.

Sometimes, the results of mental model studies are domain specific, such as the finding that people tend to ignore herd immunity when thinking about vaccines (Downs et al. 2008) and overestimate how well they can tell whether a potential partner has a sexually transmitted infection (Downs et al. 2004). Sometimes, the results are general, such as the finding that people have difficulty predicting nonlinear processes (e.g., climate change) or how small risks mount up over time (Gonzalez & Mehlhorn 2016, Tong & Feiler 2017). Studies of mental models typically begin with open-ended interviews structured around the analysis and aimed at capturing intuitive formulations and modes of expression.

Calibration (how appropriate people's confidence in their knowledge is).

Using knowledge wisely requires knowing its limits. Overconfidence can lead to making decisions without enough information and missing signs that things are going wrong. Under-confidence can lead to the opposite. Perhaps the most common way to study the appropriateness of confidence is with calibration tests. These tests ask people to indicate the probability that they have answered each question in a set correctly. People are perfectly calibrated when they are correct x% of the time when giving an x% chance of being correct. The properties of calibration tasks have been studied intensely (Budescu et al. 1997, O'Hagan et al. 2006). For example, people may believe that they have answered fewer items correctly than their item-by-item probabilities imply (e.g., they believe that they had six correct answers among ten items assigned a mean probability of 80%) (May 1991, Sniezek & Buckley 1991). As a result, global and local confidence must be assessed separately. Understanding these tasks well has allowed researchers to tailor them to studies of individual differences and training, as described below.

One recent focus of calibration research has been how to create incentives for people to reveal their true confidence and not give strategic responses (e.g., hedging, boasting). The US National Weather Service has long used scoring rules to encourage candid probability-of-precipitation forecasts (Murphy & Winkler 1974). It hopes, for example, to avoid umbrella bias, whereby forecasters overstate the probability of precipitation so that no one gets caught in the rain, even if this means many people will carry umbrellas needlessly. However, because scoring rules are so abstract, forecasters need extensive feedback to master them. As a result, scoring rules are only practical for multi-round studies like the Good Judgment Project (described below). When people cannot be trained on specific scoring rules, it may still be possible to identify the rules that they use implicitly and interpret their judgments appropriately (Merkle & Steyvers 2013).

Pooling (how much a crowd knows).

In cases where individuals' knowledge is limited, and their confidence questionable, the pooled judgment of a crowd may be more accurate than that of any of its members. This topic has been the subject of intense research, including both empirical studies and formal analyses (Danileiko & Lee 2018, Davis-Stober et al. 2014, Mannes et al. 2014). In general, the research finds that crowds are more accurate when each member knows something different, meaning that their judgments are correlated with the criterion but uncorrelated with one another (or even negatively correlated). Davis-Stober et al. (2014) offer an analytical account of these conditions, including ways to evaluate the accuracy of a crowd without already knowing the correct answers for some of its predictions.

Although often called the wisdom of the crowd, such accuracy typically comes without an explanation. As a result, recipients can only guess what evidence supports a prediction, how general it is, and what it implies for their mental models of the processes producing the predicted outcomes. Providing such explanations is an opportunity for future research, as is the related challenge of explaining the black-box predictions produced by machine learning programs that identify patterns buried in vast datasets.

Consistency

The most familiar consistency standard is Bayesian inference, which provides rules for how people should evaluate evidence and update their beliefs (Edwards et al. 1963, Kyburg & Smokler 1964). It is the standard used in many well-known lines of research, such as studies that examine the conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman 1983) and base-rate neglect (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). Nonetheless, Bayesian inference has its critics. Some object to its use of beliefs, as these express subjective rather than frequentistic probabilities, which summarize the relative frequency of repeated events (e.g., coin flips, rainy days). In the long-running debate over the nature of probability, Bayesians argue that a subjective judgment is required to decide that events are identical enough to be treated as repeated. As a result, they claim that there are no objective probabilities (Edwards et al. 1963).

Other critics object to the Bayesian requirement that people allocate 100% of their subjective probability to a fixed set of hypotheses. These critics argue that people sometimes feel that their hypotheses are incomplete or unclear. In such cases, they should be able to reserve some probability for unimagined possibilities or clearer thinking (Gärdenfors & Sahlin 1988). Indeed, formal analyses have shown that some inferential tasks are so complex that having consistent beliefs may be an unreasonable aspiration (Dasgupta et al. 2017, Schum 1994).

An alternative standard of consistency, which addresses these concerns, is Dempster-Shafer inference. Rather than looking at the balance of evidence, as in Bayesian inference, Dempster-Shafer inference looks at its conclusiveness. Shafer & Tversky (1986) argue for using the consistency standard that best fits how people naturally think about a task. That advice has been followed in studies that use different standards to illuminate how people think about different kinds of evidence, often using multi-method approaches. One such study used details from a jury trial and found that people treat contradictory evidence (which says different things about the same event) differently than they treat conflicting evidence (which points in different directions) (Curley 2007). Another such study found that people have consistent beliefs about the conclusiveness of evidence, which the authors called known unknowns (Walters et al. 2017). A third study found that people use terms like "confidence" to describe uncertainty about their knowledge and terms like "likelihood" to describe their uncertainty about the world (Üklümen et al. 2016). That usage parallels Bayesians' preference for "assessing" subjective probabilities and "estimating" frequentistic ones.

These studies reflect three emerging trends, arising from the concern that people may think about tasks in fundamentally different ways than researchers imagine. One trend is using multiple tasks, hoping to triangulate on lay perspectives. The second is using open-ended tasks, letting people speak in their own terms and possibly reveal unexpected ways of thinking. The third is replacing formal constructs with approximations (e.g., known unknowns, rather than second-order probabilities), seeking the sweet spot between the questions that researchers want to ask and the questions that people can answer. For example, Walters et al. (2017) used a combination of think-aloud protocols, eliciting spontaneous expressions of uncertainty; text boxes, asking participants to write down known unknowns; and rating scales, asking for evaluations of a list of unknowns.

How people make judgments about their world has long been a central concern of decision-making research. Such research has advanced by devising tasks that allow people to reveal themselves more fully and by analyzing those tasks more thoughtfully in terms of the performance standards of accuracy and consistency. Research on preferences has progressed in much the same way, with one important difference described immediately below.

PREFERENCES

Decision science has no accuracy criterion for preferences. People can prefer whatever they want, an assumption that is shared by neoclassical economics. However, decision science does have a consistency standard: Preferences should follow the utility theory axioms (Edwards 1954). When that happens, people are deemed rational over the options involved. Those axioms include being able to compare any two outcomes, making trade-offs between any two outcomes, and ignoring how outcomes are described (if the end states remain the same).

Economists assume that people are rational, in this sense. They then infer what matters to them from observed behavior. Such revealed preference analyses also assume that people have stable preferences, which they reveal in all their choices; that researchers know how people perceive those choices; and, sometimes, that the choices are made in efficient markets (Becker 1976).

Psychologists are free to test these axioms, as are the behavioral economists who have followed their lead. Indeed, violations of the axioms underlie much current theory. For example, a key assumption of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) is that preferences depend on the reference point evoked by how outcomes are described (e.g., are raises compared with current salaries, expected raises, or other employees' raises?). Such sensitivity violates the axiom that holds that how outcomes are described should not matter, only their consequences. Another widely studied violation arises when the relative attractiveness of two options is reversed by adding a third option that is inferior to both, hence should be irrelevant. A recent review concluded that such irrelevant options have the greatest effect when people lack strong prior preferences and contextual cues are made more salient (Huber et al. 2014). The review also notes how marketers manipulate those conditions, for example, by manipulating the appearance of online reviews, using an orderly presentation to make comparisons easier or a chaotic display to make them harder.

One pitfall in preference research is that abstract axioms can lead to abstract tasks, which people have difficulty answering. Indeed, the first Annual Review of Psychology article on judgment and decision making lamented a study that "threw out 61 per cent of…subjects" (Edwards 1961, p. 491) for having inconsistent preferences on an abstract task that proved too confusing. Such problems have continued to plague studies that try to elicit precise preferences. For example, health-care policy analysts often pose axiom-based standard gambles, such as, "What probability of getting moderate sleep quality would be just as good as a 50/50 chance of getting the best possible or the worst possible sleep quality?" Such questions prove so hard to answer that studies routinely exclude many responses as seemingly not reflecting the respondents' true preferences (Engel et al. 2016). Similarly, cost-benefit analysts often ask people how much they are willing to pay, in dollar terms, to protect nonmarket goods (e.g., historic sites, endangered invertebrates, child welfare). These questions are so hard (or objectionable) that many people refuse to answer or give other protest responses (Meyerhoff & Liebe 2010).

From a practical perspective, these measurement failures are troubling because they undermine the credibility of the health-care policies or cost-benefit analyses that they are meant to inform. From a theoretical perspective, though, such failures can be sources of insight, showing how context affects expressed preferences. The artificiality of the tasks has encouraged a constructed preference approach (e.g., Huber et al. 2014), which assumes that people must infer their preferences for unfamiliar choices, rather than immediately knowing what they want for all possible options (as economists' stable preference assumption implies) (Lichtenstein & Slovic 2006).

Constructed preference research takes several forms. One uses experimental manipulations to compare formally equivalent tasks that evoke psychologically different processes, as in a study examining how people construct risk preferences in response to task cues (Pedroni et al. 2018). A second infers those processes from observations that capture natural variation, as in a study that observed stability in risk and time preferences but not social preferences (Chang & Schechter 2015). A third makes such inferences for experimental studies, as in a review that concluded that choice architecture field experiments that manipulate how options are presented reveal too little about participants' preference construction processes to evaluate the underlying theories (Szaszi et al. 2017).

These concerns have prompted renewed interest in process-tracing methods (Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al. 2017). These methods, which have long been part of behavioral decision research (Fischhoff 1996, Payne et al. 1993, Svenson 1979), attempt to clarify how people form preferences by asking them to think aloud or manipulate stimuli as they perform tasks. Three research trends have encouraged the adoption of such methods. One trend is the development of protocols for coding observed behavior into analytical terms (e.g., options, sources of uncertainty). These protocols allow more reliable coding, and clearer comparisons across studies, compared to the emergent codes of grounded theory, which dominate qualitative research (Bryant & Charmaz 2007). A second trend is the greater acceptance of concurrent verbal protocols in which people report how they are making decisions, thereby avoiding problems with retrospective verbal protocols in which people report how they made decisions (Ericsson & Simon 1992). A third trend is a greater willingness to accept the risks of reactive measurement, whereby researchers might influence study participants by asking them to describe their thinking, relative to the risks of misinterpreting their responses to structured tasks.

Increased methodological heterogeneity has also encouraged research into sacred (or protected) values, which people will not compromise. Such values are nonrational, because they violate the utility theory axiom that requires willingness to make trade-offs among all outcomes. However, sacred values can be central to thoughtful decisions (Baron & Spranca 1997). Mixed-method research programs have, for example, described the roles of sacred values in overcoming the psychological numbing associated with immense problems, like genocide (Slovic & Slovic 2015), and in discouraging violent extremism (Atran 2016).

Thus, with preference as with judgment, task analysis has framed descriptive research. That framing has revealed nonrational behavior worthy of theoretical accounts, such as the inconsistent preferences that prompted the development of prospect theory. It has also revealed the limits to rationality, such as the struggles with abstract tasks that prompted the constructed preference approach. Analogous patterns emerge in the study of choice tasks, wherein people combine their preferences (what they want) and their judgments (what they can get) to make decisions.

CHOICE

Birnbaum (2011) distinguishes two complementary approaches to studying how people make choices: experiments and modeling.

Experiments ask how sensitive people are to the factors that researchers manipulate. They represent a piecemeal research strategy, with each experiment estimating the effects of a few factors while holding all other factors constant. Extrapolating from any single experiment requires estimating the impact of varying each other factor. Creating a coherent account requires a suite of experiments, whose manipulations are derived from an underlying theory and supported by studies of task features (as with calibration tasks). Because recent Annual Review of Psychology articles have emphasized theory-driven experimental approaches (Lerner et al. 2015, Oppenheimer & Kelso 2015, Weber & Johnson 2009), we focus here on modeling.

Decision modeling uses statistical procedures such as multiple regression analysis to estimate the relative importance of the factors that describe each option in a choice set (Karelaia & Hogarth 2008). For example, the options might be graduate student apartments, with the factors being size, location, cost, and safety; or the options might be graduate students, with the factors being grade point average (GPA), graduate record examination (GRE) scores, and quality of undergraduate institution (Dawes et al. 1989). The importance of any factor depends on the set of options. For example, graduate students, who are generally sensitive to cost, might ignore it when choosing among apartments with roughly the same rent. Graduate admission committees, which normally consider GRE scores, might ignore them if they are highly correlated with GPAs. Some decision models estimate weights for synthetic factors such as loss aversion (described below), a construct central to cumulative prospect theory (CPT) (Tversky & Kahneman 1992). Given how heavily CPT has been studied, we use it to illustrate current approaches to decision modeling.

CPT incorporates several behavioral principles in a single model. Loss aversion is one. It reflects a tendency to be more sensitive to losses than to equal-sized gains (e.g., losing versus winning $5). Risk tolerance, probability weighting, and choice stochasticity are other CPT principles. The CPT decision model has a parameter for each principle. Parameter values are estimated for research participants' choices among gambles described in terms of probabilities of winning and losing specified amounts. If those estimates were stable, they would give the theory predictive power. However, they have proven highly variable (Davis-Stober et al. 2016, Regenwetter & Robinson 2017).

One qualitative review concluded that the magnitude of loss aversion depended on task features such as how the outcomes are framed, how large the stakes are, and how long the experiment runs (Ert & Erev 2013). A somewhat later quantitative meta-analysis found weak overall evidence of any loss aversion (Walasek et al. 2018). However, the review's authors also lamented the poor quality of the methods and reporting in many studies, which made it unclear whether loss aversion did not exist or was lost in the noise. The decision by sampling (DbS) model estimates loss aversion (and other CPT parameters) by assuming that people make decisions by sampling their evaluations of previous options from memory and comparing them to the options in experimental choices (Stewart et al. 2006, 2015). Drawing on cognitive psychology, DbS also posits task features that can affect the sampling and comparison processes. Those features include aspects of the options (e.g., the distributions of outcomes and probabilities) and the task (e.g., the time allowed to reflect on the choice).

Sensitivity to task features means that parameter estimates may not be comparable for studies that offer different choices or present the same choices in different ways. One such task feature is whether outcomes are described, in summary form (e.g., x% chance of winning a y amount of dollars), or experienced, with people observing a set of trials before making their own choices. One proposal holds that people rely on unduly small samples when making such experience-based choices, which leads them to underweight small probabilities, contrary to the predictions of CPT, which is typically studied with description-based choices (Hertwig et al. 2004). Although initial descriptive studies appeared to support that hypothesis, a formal analysis concluded that the experience-sampling process produced different gambles than the ones described by CPT, rendering the comparison moot (Hadar & Fox 2009).

Using information theory to assess how well a set of choices can reveal decision weights, Broomell & Bhatia (2014) concluded that the stimuli commonly used to provide experience cannot, in principle, be used to estimate the CPT parameters. As a result, those stimuli could not reveal the underweighting of small probabilities, even if it were to occur. This analytical approach has allowed reanalysis of existing studies that compared decisions by description and by experience (Kellen et al. 2016) and has guided the design of tasks that could allow estimating decision weights for experience-based choices in studies that found less sensitivity to probabilities than with description-based choices (Glöckner et al. 2016).

Like most behavioral decision research, description-based choices involve one-time decisions. Experience-based choices revive the field's early interest in repeated decisions, including both sequential decisions, in which information accumulates over time, and dynamic decisions, in which choices can affect the options faced in future rounds. However, as noted in the third Annual Review of Psychology article on decision-making research, determining the optimal solution for repeated choices can be daunting for researchers and impossible for research participants (Rapoport & Wallsten 1972). An alternative research strategy engages people in multiple-play computer simulations and then compares their behaviors with the results of having the computer apply well-defined choice strategies. Soon after such simulations became technically possible, Brehmer (1992) and his colleagues created one for fighting forest fires, which appeared to engage its sponsors, the Swedish Armed Forces, which could see analogies with their own domain, without quibbling about technical (military) details. The price to pay for such verisimilitude is having to derive solutions experientially rather than analytically (Kahneman & Klein 2009). More recent dynamic decision-making research has linked tasks to theories of cognitive processes (Gonzalez & Mehlhorn 2016, Mohan et al. 2017).

Thus, with choice, as with judgment and preference, the commitment to characterizing tasks in analytical terms has allowed researchers to pool results across diverse tasks, revealing both general trends and variation. The next two sections consider research addressing two possible sources of variation: individual differences and life-span changes in decision-making competence. These studies, too, reflect the increased heterogeneity of the field's methods, tasks, and perspectives.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

Individual differences played little role in early behavioral decision research. One reason was that researchers focused on how people, in general, behave. That focus encourages research that varies tasks across studies rather than standardizing them, as required for individual-difference measures. A second reason was that the tasks were not understood well enough to take advantage of the precision of decision science constructs, compared to the bewildering richness of constructs for personality (Ashton et al. 2004) and cognitive style (Pashler et al. 2009). A third reason was that early studies found so little evidence of individual differences in risk-taking propensity (Slovic 1964) and cognitive style that Huber (1983) recommended abandoning the search, absent a breakthrough in theory or method (and then followed his own advice).

One such breakthrough arose from recognizing that people who take risks in one domain (e.g., health, sports, research) need not take them in others (e.g., investment, child care). That insight underlies the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale, which can be adapted to specific domains in ways that facilitate comparisons across them (Weber et al. 2002). The Medical Maximizer-Minimizer Scale (MMS) focuses on a single domain, asking whether people describe themselves as trying to find the best possible option or just an adequate one when making medical decisions (Scherer et al. 2016). Jackson et al. (2017) offer a battery of measures assessing both decision-making style and performance.

Our own research, developing individual-difference measures of decision-making competence (DMC), illustrates such studies. Our measures used tasks selected from experimental studies of judgment, preference, and choice. Those tasks used both accuracy and consistency performance standards and differed enough to reduce shared-method variance (Podsakoff et al. 2012). A youth version (Y-DMC) was administered at the age-18 assessment to participants in a longitudinal study of the Center for Drug and Alcohol Research (CEDAR), which followed them from age 10 to age 30 (Tarter & Vanyukov 2001). Scores on the main Y-DMC factor correlated with CEDAR measures in ways that affirmed the tasks' external validity—and, by implication, that of the research literature from which they were drawn (Parker & Fischhoff 2005).

Y-DMC scores were higher for CEDAR participants who were fortunate enough to have grown up in conditions that might model and reinforce good decision making, including higher socioeconomic status, greater social support, more positive peer environments, and lower risk status (defined as not having a father with a substance abuse problem). Y-DMC scores were lower for CEDAR participants who behaved in ways that suggest poor decision making. Those behaviors included antisocial disorders, delinquency, marijuana use, and having multiple sexual partners. Y-DMC scores were also higher for participants with higher scores on tests of fixed and fluid intelligence. However, the general patterns remained in semi-partial correlations controlling for those scores. An adult version of the measure (A-DMC) showed similar patterns (Bruine de Bruin et al. 2007). When administered to CEDAR participants at their age-30 assessment, scores on A-DMC and Y-DMC (from age 18) correlated 0.50, suggesting stable individual differences (Parker et al. 2018).

In these studies, neighborhood disadvantage (at age 10) was the strongest predictor of both Y-DMC and A-DMC scores, both with and without controlling for the intelligence scores. That result is consistent with the diverse evidence that Mullainathan & Shafir (2013) assembled in arguing for the pervasive negative effects of resource constraints on decision making. Understanding the role of such social factors in decision making is an important topic for future research. For example, how do perceptions of opportunity and discrimination affect how people acquire and apply their decision-making skills? How do their decisions reflect their perceived ability to recover from the misfortune that sometimes awaits even the best decisions and decisions that require making the best of a bad situation (Hall et al. 2014)?

CEDAR provided an unusual opportunity to track changes over time. The next section describes cross-sectional research, examining the developmental course of decision making by comparing individuals in different age cohorts.

LIFE SPAN

The correlation between DMC scores at ages 18 and 30 showed consistency in relative performance. However, the two tests (Y-DMC and A-DMC) were sufficiently different that we did not compare absolute scores and therefore did not ask how much better (or worse) CEDAR participants had become as decision makers over that period. However, an increasing number of studies have administered the same tasks to people of different ages and then compared their performance. Researchers have focused in particular on adolescents, hoping to help them survive vulnerable years, and on the elderly, hoping to help them live out their lives with dignity (Hess et al. 2015, Reyna et al. 2012).

One widely cited claim about adolescents echoes folk wisdom in holding that they have an irrational sense of personal invulnerability (Elkind 1967). In examining such claims, behavioral decision research begins by analyzing teens' decisions. That analysis can clarify when and why teens and adults see decisions differently and make different choices, given their different beliefs and preferences. It can also clarify how teens' decision making interacts with other aspects of their lives. For example, impulsiveness, sometimes linked to the teen brain, might undermine teens' decision making, if it leads them to act against their own best judgment. However, poor decision making might also invite impulsiveness, if it leads teens to drift indecisively from situations where deliberation is possible to situations where emotions dominate.

In an example of a study adopting this perspective, Goldberg et al. (2009) had teens judge the risks and benefits of trying marijuana. A priori, teens who decide to try marijuana might be impulsive or have an exaggerated sense of personal invulnerability. However, the best predictor of trying marijuana proved to be whether teens believed that marijuana would prove so good that they could not stop using it. Teens who did not realize that possibility would have a failure of affective forecasting. A health message for reducing that risk might, paradoxically, emphasize how unimaginably good marijuana can be for some people, who cannot know until they try.

In addition to offering analytical tools, theoretical perspectives, and measurement methods that complement other approaches to studying teens, behavioral decision research also imposes a discipline: Understanding any decision begins by analyzing how fully informed individuals would view it in terms relevant to their values (Fischhoff 1996, 2008). That discipline can reveal issues that might otherwise be missed. For example, by identifying what they called the "risk in the benefit" of marijuana, Goldberg et al. (2009) raised the question of how to convey the addictive potential of marijuana to people who have never tried it. Would it help to point to other behaviors that some people find too good to stop (e.g., drinking, smoking, exercising, eating donuts)? What do people infer when others claim that they could stop but never do? What are the risks and benefits of teens' heightened sensitivity to peers' feelings and responses?

The discipline of analyzing decisions can also reduce the risk of a rush to judgment when assessing the competence of individuals whose choices appear suboptimal. The stakes riding on teens' perceived ability to make sound choices can be high (Blakemore 2018, Casey 2013, Salekin 2015). Justice Antonin Scalia criticized the American Psychological Association (APA) for highlighting teens' competence in a case regarding reproductive rights and teens' incompetence in a case regarding adjudication as adults for violent offenses [Roper v. Simmons (2005), dissenting opinion].

In principle, both APA claims could be valid (Steinberg et al. 2009). The teens and the decisions in the two cases are very different. However, evaluating those differences requires detailed analysis, considering teens' options, goals, beliefs, and constraints before making general claims about their DMC and affective control. That analysis would ask, for example, how social coercion affects teens' options, how trustworthy their information sources are (and appear to be), and what safety net backstops the experimentation essential to their development. A decision science perspective could also help clarify the self-regulatory processes studied by developmental psychologists (Blakemore 2018, Casey 2013).

The promise of such collaboration can be seen in an application of fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna 2012), which asks how people extract the gist of a decision, to a sexual behavior program (Reyna & Mills 2014). Teens' understanding improved when the program added modules giving the gist of cognitively difficult issues [e.g., "Even low risks add up to 100% if you keep doing it" (Reyna & Mills 2014, p. 1633)]. Another example is applying decision science principles to the forensic evaluation and treatment of juveniles (Salekin 2015). In these examples, as in the interventions described below, decision science addresses only one element of a complex setting. If basic research results fail to replicate, it could mean that they are not true or that they are overwhelmed by factors held constant in basic research, like orchids that wilt outside restricted conditions.

Studies of aging have also surged in recent years, prompted by concern for an aging population and aided by the relative ease of studying older people compared to teens. Whereas studies of teens have focused on how they acquire decision-making skills, studies of aging have focused on how people lose them (Levy et al. 2018). Whereas teens are often viewed as failing or flailing in a supportive world, aging adults are often seen as struggling in a hostile one (Ross et al. 2014).

Here, too, shared concerns have prompted unusual collaborations among fields as varied as neuroscience, learning, memory, intelligence, emotion, health behavior, and dyadic relationships (Hess et al. 2015). Here, too, discerning the roles of multiple processes can be challenging. One integrative study used structural equation modeling to assess how performance on decision-making tasks was related to changes in sensory functioning, processing speed, and education. It found that age-related decline in working memory was a strong predictor of performance decrements, even after controlling for other factors (Del Missier et al. 2015).

Age groups are heterogeneous, meaning that caution is needed when generalizing about them. With that proviso, current results might support some guarded conclusions: By the mid-teen years (15–16 years of age), adolescents appear to have acquired the (imperfect) cognitive decision-making skills of adults. They possess knowledge of varying quality, depending what they have experienced and been taught, and whose word they trust. They have less control over their emotions and social environment, potentially compromising the balance of reason and passion in their choices. They have greater need and desire for experience and experimentation (Reyna et al. 2012).

As people age, they appear to retain their basic decision-making skills, barring health-related impairment. However, their proficiency in applying those skills may decline for tasks requiring complex mental operations. On the other hand, for familiar decisions, they may have learned what to choose and how to live with the outcomes. They may, however, be just as vulnerable for unfamiliar ones (Hess et al. 2015, Ross et al. 2014).

These collaborations between decision science and developmental psychology appear mutually beneficial. The former offers analytical methods for characterizing decisions and theoretical perspectives for interpreting behavior. The latter offers understanding of decisions' social, affective, and physiological context. Advances in neuroimaging and comparative (interspecies) psychology have spurred research using decision-making tasks suited to those research settings (Blakemore 2018, Casey 2013). Deeper involvement of decision scientists might aid in interpreting results and designing tasks.

One topic for future research is how the decisions that people face vary across the life span. That research could ask when teens' apparent failings reflect not less decision-making competence but more difficult choices, as they learn to deal with school, careers, relationships, sexuality, avocations, drugs, alcohol, and more. In that light, the fairest intergenerational comparisons might be with major new choices. For older people, those choices might include retirement, serious illness, downsizing, and loss. A second promising area is research on children and infants, which lost two creative researchers in their prime, Janet Jacobs (Jacobs & Klaczynski 2005) and Vittorio Girotto (Girotto & Gonzalez 2008). A third is applying decision science to the elusive concept of wisdom as expressed at different ages (Grossmann 2017).

APPLICATIONS

Improving Decisions and Decision Making

Decision science interventions seek to empower people to make sound, independent choices and to provide needed protections when that proves impossible. Its interventions can be evaluated in two ways. One is seeing whether they lead to people making better choices. The second is seeing whether they lead to people having better decision-making processes, from which better choices should follow.

The first strategy also underlies libertarian paternalist interventions, which manipulate individuals' choice architecture to induce better choices, defined as those that would be made by fully informed, rational individuals (Thaler & Sunstein 2008). Such interventions would, for example, make organ donation the default option only for people whose survivors will accept that choice without having had a family consultation. They would invoke social norms to encourage health behaviors (e.g., diet, vaccinations) only for people who have the resources to adopt them and a safety net should things go wrong. They would direct retirement savings to the stock market only for people whose expected financial returns outweigh the expected psychological cost from experiencing market corrections and the economic risk from being in the stock market when the funds are needed.

Analyzing each target individual's decision is, however, too demanding for most interventions. Medical decision-making researchers pursue a more modest but still ambitious goal: identifying the best choices for modal patients (Schwartz & Bergus 2008). They use standard gambles to elicit health state preferences and combine them with medical knowledge to identify the choices that fully informed, rational patients would make. They address patient heterogeneity with sensitivity analyses, repeating the calculations with values drawn from the distributions of patient conditions and preferences (Basu & Meltzer 2007). They may also create decision aids, letting patients explore the decision space themselves (Ott. Hosp. 2019).

In order to measure health states better, the National Institutes of Health has created an inventory of psychometrically validated self-report scales, available online at no cost, with adaptive testing for efficient administration (Cella et al. 2007). That initiative, called PROMIS^®, was prompted by a proliferation of outcome measures of widely varying quality, which had reduced comparability across studies (e.g., different ways to elicit self-reported pain or cognitive functioning). More recently, PROMIS has applied decision science methods to estimate utilities for seven of its domains (e.g., sleep quality, social functioning) for use in health-care policy analyses (Dewitt et al. 2018).

The alternative to promoting better choices is promoting better decision-making processes, as defined by performance on judgment, preference, and choice tasks. Such interventions have been tried ever since researchers realized that people are imperfect decision makers (Slovic et al. 1977). One natural strategy is warning people about biases. Unfortunately, such warnings appear to have limited value (Milkman et al. 2009). People may lack the cognitive structures or capacity needed to act on them; or they may neglect warnings in situations that evoke intuitive, rather than reflective, decision making. They may also consider themselves immune to bias, once they have learned about the error from observing others' behavior (Kahneman 2011, Kahneman & Klein 2009).

However, it has long been known that people can master some skills when provided the conditions needed for learning: prompt and unambiguous feedback, proper incentives, and instruction in unintuitive processes (e.g., how risks mount up over time). Individuals who have such conditions, such as weather forecasters (Murphy & Winkler 1974) and financial auditors (Tomassini et al. 1982), have sometimes been found to produce reasonably well-calibrated confidence assessments. The next two sections describe interventions designed to create those conditions for people who do not have them.

Confidence Assessment: The Good Judgment Project

A common finding in calibration studies is that confidence and knowledge are positively, but imperfectly, correlated, such that people tend to be overconfident with hard tasks and underconfident with easy ones. The behavioral and statistical properties of that pattern have been vigorously studied and debated (Budescu et al. 1997, O'Hagan et al. 2006). There is little controversy, though, about the poor conditions for learning that everyday experience provides. Judgments are not explicit. Feedback is delayed and scattered. Bravado may be rewarded, rather than candor. It is especially hard to accumulate the experience needed to calibrate very strong (or weak) confidence, which entails estimating small probabilities of being wrong (or right) (Wickelgren 1977).

Building on an early study (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff 1980) in which calibration improved with concentrated feedback (200 judgments per round, personal discussion of results) and generalized beyond training tasks, the Good Judgment Project created a landmark training effort (Atanasov et al. 2017, Moore et al. 2017). It recruited thousands of individuals, many with substantive expertise, to provide probabilistic forecasts for hundreds of geopolitical events and then receive structured feedback. Rather than replicating any single laboratory study, the investigators drew on any theory, method, or result that they thought might be useful. For example, they provided feedback with a scoring rule that distinguished three aspects of performance: how much people know (knowledge), how well they can distinguish levels of confidence (resolution), and how well they can assign numerical values to those levels (calibration). The study advised participants to use models in order to reduce their cognitive load and improve their reliability. It defined events precisely enough that their occurrence or nonoccurrence could be observed, as required for meaningful feedback. It also took advantage of its large sample to compare variants on its basic intervention.

The Good Judgment Project found that (a) a brief, intense dose of training, coupled with scoring-rule feedback, produced sustained improvements; (b) remote interaction with other participants helped somewhat; (c) individual differences were stable enough to reveal superforecasters; and (d) people who joined, and stayed, in the study were better calibrated than participants in most previous studies (Atanasov et al. 2017, Moore et al. 2017). Given the central role of expert judgment in policy analyses (see below), these results have important practical implications (see also Dhami et al. 2015, Morgan 2017, O'Hagan et al. 2006).

Diagnostic Decisions: Night Shift

Another sustained training effort applied decision science to address a costly failure of expert judgment (Mohan et al. 2012, 2017): Despite continuing efforts by the American College of Surgeons (ACS) and others, 60% of severely injured patients who present at local hospital emergency departments (EDs) are not transferred to major medical facilities that can provide needed care. An archetypal case is an older person who has fallen, with no obvious injuries but suspected intracranial bleeding as cause or effect of the fall. Rather than transfer the patient, the local hospital orders a computerized axial tomography (CAT) scan, even though a confirmatory result will arrive after the golden period for transfer has passed.

In signal detection theory (SDT) terms (Lynn & Barrett 2014), flawed transfer decisions could reflect poor discrimination ability or poor decision rules. ED physicians might have poor discrimination ability because diagnostically difficult (as opposed to medically difficult) cases are rare and because they receive limited feedback on what happens after patients leave the ED. ED physicians might have poor decision rules because they are under financial pressure to keep patients or because they want to demonstrate their skill, not realizing that their expertise cannot compensate for their hospital's limited ability to provide aftercare. A study asking ED physicians to evaluate detailed (anonymized) patient records found that some had good discrimination but poor decision rules, whereas others had good decision rules but poor discrimination (Mohan et al. 2012).

The heterogeneity in physicians' performance means that any general intervention would have to serve physicians with diverse discrimination abilities and decision rules. To that end, Mohan et al. (2017) created two serious games designed to improve physicians' use of the representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman 1974) when assessing case severity, a criterion capturing both discrimination ability and decision rules. Presented online, both interventions sought to make atypical severe cases (e.g., an older person falling) seem more representative of the underlying pathology. Both provided feedback missing from physicians' normal experience. They differed in the learning theories that guided their design (narrative engagement versus analogical reasoning). Both improved performance on a third simulation, which was administered both immediately after training and six months later, compared to equal doses of traditional (ACS) training. Whether that improvement extends to clinical practice is an open question, and one that may be hard to answer, given the many factors affecting actual performance. In another domain, Canfield et al. (2017) found it impossible to evaluate anti-phishing training externally, despite having detailed records from spyware installed on computers (with their users' permission). They found that users' vulnerability to malware depended on factors unrelated to users' vigilance, such as their choice of computer, browser, Internet service provider, or automatic updates.

Both the Good Judgment Project and the serious games for ED physician interventions reflect the same basic learning principles: People acquire skills best when they receive good feedback about their performance, direct instruction about unintuitive patterns, opportunities to practice, and appropriate incentives. The success of both interventions required attention to myriad details, such as how well the Good Judgment Project communicated its scoring rules and how well the serious games implemented representativeness. As a result, both required collaboration with practitioners who could provide substantive knowledge (e.g., about world events, trauma), recruit expert participants, design engaging interfaces, and collect secure data. Had the interventions failed, the theory might have been flawed or its implementation might have been undermined by not getting one of those components right. The concluding section of this review discusses the conditions that foster such collaboration.

COST, RISK, AND BENEFIT ANALYSES

US Presidential Executive Order 12291 requires cost-benefit analyses for all federal policies with expected economic impacts over $100 million. Regulations in many countries require quantitative risk analyses (e.g., for policies affecting air and water pollution). Private sector organizations often commission quantitative analyses for internal or external consumption. Decision science has played three interrelated roles in such analyses: (a) improving the expert judgments that shape them, (b) translating human behavior into analytic terms, and (c) communicating between organizations and their stakeholders (e.g., consumers, regulators, investors, voters). The following sections illustrate each role, focusing on analyses intended to inform public policies.

Judgment in Analysis

The combination of analytical and empirical approaches allows decision science to address the two kinds of subjectivity found in any analysis: expert judgments in assessing its inputs and value judgments in setting its terms (Fischhoff & Kadvany 2011). Both contributions have benefited from early collaboration between psychologists and management scientists in creating decision analysis (Raiffa 1968, von Winterfeldt & Edwards 1986), which elicits decision makers' beliefs and preferences as inputs to calculating the expected utility of choice options. Medical decision aids (Ott. Hosp. 2019) are a form of decision analysis.

These collaborations positioned decision scientists to be active players when risk analysis emerged as a field in the 1960s and 1970s (Fischhoff 2015). They were among the founders of the Society for Risk Analysis in 1981. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission turned to them (among others) when its technical analyses did not convince the public that nuclear power had acceptable risks (Fischhoff et al. 1981). Decision scientists were also early contributors to analyzing and communicating the risks of climate change (Chen et al. 1983).

Risk analyses decompose complex processes (e.g., nuclear power plants, terrorist attacks, sea-level rise) into more knowable parts. When data are available (e.g., valve failure rates), they can be used as model inputs. When they are not, expert elicitation can be used to provide disciplined judgments. The Good Judgment Project elicited judgments for discrete events from many individuals; more intensive methods include interactive computer programs and day-long interviews that guide experts in reflecting on the internal consistency of their judgments (Morgan 2017, O'Hagan et al. 2006). These methods assume that experts are like everyone else once they run out of evidence and must rely on judgment. Testing that assumption is an important topic for future research.

Decision science has two roles in studying the value judgments found in all analyses. The first is identifying them. For example, defining risk (or benefit) is inherently value laden. A risk analysis (e.g., for a hazardous waste facility) could consider just mortality or also morbidity. Mortality estimates could consider just the expected number of fatalities or also the expected number of life-years lost with those deaths (a measure that gives greater weight to deaths of younger individuals). An analysis could consider (or ignore) whether risks are borne by people who do not benefit from a policy; it could consider (or ignore) when deaths might occur and whether to discount future lives; it could focus on identifiable lives or statistical ones (Slovic & Slovic 2015); and so on. Decision science has helped make these issues part of public discourse and analytical practice (Fischhoff 2015, Morgan 2017).

Decision science's second role is resolving those value issues. For quantitative outcomes, it has contributed preference elicitation procedures (see above). For more qualitative aspects of risk, psychometric studies have identified dimensions of concern, with the most common being dread and uncertainty (Glassman-Fox & Weber 2016). These dimensions are often treated as irrational; however, they can be legitimate bases for public policy. Policy makers might care about the psychological (and physiological) consequences of feelings of dread (Slovic 2001). They might wonder whether lay observers' sense of uncertainty suggests problems that analysts do not see or acknowledge (Broomell & Kane 2017).

Human Behavior in Analysis

Human behavior affects the costs, risks, and benefits of many policies. However, even when analysts recognize its relevance and accept behavioral science as a source of evidence (which not all analysts do), they still need its results in analysis-friendly terms. SDT is one way to satisfy that need (Lynn & Barrett 2014). As noted above, SDT characterizes performance in terms of how well individuals can detect signals and the decision rules they use when translating those perceptions into observable behavior. For analysts, SDT provides quantitative estimates (e.g., false-negative rates) to use in their calculations, including perhaps how those estimates vary across individuals and are affected by interventions (e.g., Mohan et al. 2012, 2017).

Originally applied to vigilance tasks (e.g., "Is that radar blip a hostile aircraft?"), SDT can be used for decisions in many noisy environments. Thus, SDT estimates for triage transfer decisions could inform policies for allocating resources and reimbursing providers (Mohan et al. 2012). Swets et al. (2000) provide examples as diverse as mammography, HIV screening, and metal fatigue detection. SDT estimates could also be used as feedback (e.g., "Here's what you are missing," or "Don't be so cautious") and inputs to system design (e.g., "We need second opinions"). Canfield & Fischhoff (2018) show how SDT estimates of computer users' susceptibility to phishing attacks could inform cybersecurity risk analyses (e.g., spear-phishing for a weak link, as when John Podesta's email was hacked to gain access to the Democratic National Committee's files during the 2016 election campaign).

One application used SDT to estimate undergraduate men's discrimination ability and decision rules when assessing young women's sexual intent (Farris et al. 2008). Those estimates could inform campus policies, by showing the extent to which young men miss signals or choose to ignore them. So, too, could the finding that alcohol consumption had different effects for interpreting behavior and clothing (Farris et al. 2010). Decision science has also been used to extract the policy implications of research into the effectiveness of self-defense measures (Fischhoff 1992).

Communication

Successful policies require two-way communication, both within organizations and with those affected by their policies. Decision science has played an active role in studying and improving the content, structure, and process of such communications. Three examples will illustrate the opportunities to affect and learn from these processes.

Intelligence analysis.

The Good Judgment Project's sponsorship by the Intelligence Advanced Research Project Agency (IARPA) is one example of the sporadic contacts between the intelligence community and decision science. The opportunities could be seen in a classic essay on the limits to verbal quantifiers (e.g., likely) written by Kent (1964), a founder of US intelligence analysis. One key juncture in connecting research and practice was a project examining the analytical processes contributing to Israel's vulnerability to the surprise attack in the 1973 war, conducted for Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Lanir & Kahneman 2006). The project led to a collaboration with Heuer (1999), a veteran CIA staffer who introduced decision science to the agency's training, procedures, and software. That connection facilitated sponsorship, by the director of the National Intelligence's Office of Analytical Integrity and Standards, of a National Academy of Sciences consensus report on applying decision science to intelligence analysis (Natl. Res. Counc. 2011). That report supported IARPA's behavioral initiative. NATO has a working group on communicating uncertainty in analysis (Ho et al. 2015), and the US Navy now has a chief decision scientist (Lerner 2019).

Drug regulation.

When evaluating new drugs, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) needs transparent communication, both within the agency and with its external stakeholders (patients, providers, producers, advocates). To meet that need, FDA (2018) restructured its decision-making processes for evaluating pharmaceuticals and biologics around a benefit-risk framework grounded in decision science principles. Those principles include distinguishing between scientific and value judgments, encouraging the expression of uncertainty, and accommodating diverse forms of evidence. FDA could apply decision science because it had staff who knew the science and could translate it into agency terms. Those staff members were also instrumental in creating FDA's statutory Risk Communication Advisory Committee and its Strategic Plan for Risk Communication (Fischhoff 2017). They could not, however, overcome the regulatory inertia that stalled the adoption of a drug fact box based on decision science principles (Schwartz & Woloshin 2013).

Climate change.

Although engaged with climate change since the late Carter administration (Chen et al. 1983), social, behavioral, and decision scientists had little role in communicating their results until the late George W. Bush administration—when the limits to letting the science speak for itself became painfully evident. Signs of change include Nature Climate Change (https://www.nature.com/nclimate/) as the first Nature publication to invite behavioral research; three National Academy of Sciences colloquia on the science of science communication, initiated by Ralph Cicerone, the Academy's president and a distinguished climate scientist; a communication guide commissioned by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Corner et al. 2018); the prominence of behavioral research at Yale Climate Connections, Climate Central, Climate Advocacy Lab, and other initiatives (e.g., van der Linden et al. 2018); and growing climate- and energy-related research (e.g., Wong-Parodi et al. 2016).

Psychology has long played a role in implementing policies aimed at helping people to eat better, save more, stop smoking, or get along with one another. These decision science applications reflect growing roles in setting policies. Those roles include communicating public concerns to policy makers and policies to the public, constraining policies with realistic assessments of human behavior, and structuring policy-making processes. By speaking the language of policy analysis, decision science has been able to translate other psychological research into policy- and analysis-relevant terms.

CONCLUSION

After briefly describing the intellectual roots of behavioral decision research (or decision science), we have reviewed research into the essential elements of all decisions (judgment, preference, and choice), differences across individuals and the life span, and practical and policy applications. One emerging theme, most obvious in the final sections of this review, is that science and society make progress together through two bridging activities, which Baddeley (1979) called applied basic psychology (seeing how theories fare in real-world settings) and basic applied psychology (domesticating phenomena observed in those settings for basic research). A second emerging theme is that the field has increased the heterogeneity of its tasks, methods, theories, and participants, partly due to these engagements.

A distinctive feature of decision science is analyzing tasks before attempting to describe how people approach them or designing interventions. The benefits of analysis include characterizing diverse tasks in common terms, thereby allowing general patterns to emerge; having clear standards for evaluating performance (and claims of bias); and being able to communicate with people from other analytically oriented fields, such as natural scientists wary of social science and policy analysts unsure how to use behavioral evidence.

One possible limit to this strategy is creating tasks that are analytically sound but cognitively intractable (e.g., standard gambles with unfamiliar health states). However, when researchers are alert to that possibility, such failures can be productive theoretically, by prompting attempts to explain anomalous behavior, and methodologically, by prompting use of research methods that are better suited to discerning fundamental differences in how people construe tasks.

A second possible limit is placing undue emphasis on anomalies. In psychology, as in other sciences, problems can be a source of insight, as when they constrain the set of heuristics to ones that could produce a pattern of biases. However, the focus on problems can create a bias meme, whereby people are seen as the sum of their failings and their capabilities are obscured.

A third possible limit is excluding researchers who are less comfortable with analysis. Fortunately, there are many efforts to reduce barriers to entry by explaining analytical concepts in ways that emphasize conceptual, rather than technical, mastery. Lynn & Barrett (2014) offer such an introduction to SDT, as do Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom (1983) for Bayesian inference, Ert (2018) for the likelihood principle, and Kaplan (2011) for operations research. The Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/) and Cochrane Collaboration (https://www.cochrane.org/) provide accessible tutorials on many topics.

The decision science strategy, integrating analytical and behavioral research, has brought psychologists into domains that include climate change, intelligence analysis, risk management, and health-care policy. That engagement has repaid some of psychology's debt to the society that has supported it, while enriching its science with new problems, evidence, and collaborators. It has often required psychologists to play three, sometimes unusual, roles. The first role is representing all of psychology, and not just their own specialty or theory, in settings where they may be the only psychologist (or even the only scientist) present. The second is serving as translators for colleagues who find applied settings unfamiliar and perhaps even uncomfortable. The third is creating sustained relations with decision makers, in order to learn their concerns, earn their trust, benefit from their expertise, and be better able to help them. When we meet these conditions, it can be good for science and society.

SUMMARY POINTS

1.	Decision science provides unique opportunities for integrating analyses of decisions and empirical studies of decision makers.
2.	Decision science has gradually increased the heterogeneity of the people and tasks it studies, as well as the diversity of its methods.
3.	Sustained relationships with practitioners have brought decision science into applied arenas and applied concerns into the research.
4.	The study of task properties has allowed identifying tasks suited to specific uses (e.g., training, measuring individual differences, eliciting expert judgments, choice modeling).
5.	Theoretically and methodologically informed interventions can improve individual and organizational decision making.
6.	Analyzing tasks allows comparing individuals' abilities to the challenges facing them and protects against unsupported generalizations about their competence.

FUTURE ISSUES

1.	Interest in constructed preferences will grow, prompting an increasing use of potentially reactive methods, such as think-aloud protocols.
2.	Analyses of decision-making tasks will continue to improve understanding of their demands, the conditions for attributions of bias, and the opportunities for interventions.
3.	Research will further disentangle the effects of experimental design (e.g., stimulus selection) on research findings.
4.	Collaboration with psychologists in other fields will increase understanding of decision making over the life span.
5.	Demand will increase for the application of decision science to strategic political and institutional decisions, as well as its use to inform repeated decisions.
6.	Decision science will play an increasing role in helping people to explain the predictions produced by crowds, machine learning, and artificial intelligence.

disclosure statement

The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

acknowledgments

We thank Wändi Bruine de Bruin, Barry Dewitt, Deepika Mohan, and Gabrielle Wong-Parodi for comments on earlier drafts, and the Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for financial support. The views expressed are those of the authors.

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    Ernst Fehr ¹ and Herbert Gintis ^{2 1}Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, CH-8006 Zurich, Switzerland; email: [email protected] ²Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501, and Central European University, Budapest, Hungary; email: [email protected]

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    • ...Recognizing the potential power of the rational actor model to unify sociological theory, Coleman (1990), Hechter (Hechter & Kanazawa 1997), Becker (1976), ...

  • Problems for Judgment and Decision Making

    R. HastiePsychology Department, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0345; e-mail: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 52: 653 - 683

    • ...and goals to discern "the method in the apparent madness" (Becker 1976, Miller & Cantor 1982)....

  • BOUNDED RATIONALITY

    Bryan D. JonesDepartment of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195; e-mail: [email protected]

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    • ...are the major additions to our understanding of rational choice (see Becker 1976)....

  • Sociology of Markets

    John LieDepartment of Sociology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 702 South Wright Street, Urbana, Illinois 61801; e-mail: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 23: 341 - 360

    • ...Consider Gary Becker's (23:8) claim that the economic approach is applicable to all human beings: "rich or poor persons, ...

  • Sociological Rational Choice Theory

    Michael HechterDepartment of Sociology, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721; e-mail: [email protected] Satoshi KanazawaDepartment of Sociology, Cornell University, Uris Hall, Ithaca, New York 14853-7601; e-mail: [email protected]

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    • ... and Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) for detailed descriptions of the component tasks and their selection....
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    • ...participating in high-intensity cardioresistance training over 16 weeks improved decision-making competence as assessed by Bruine de Bruin et al.'s (2007)...
    • ...Initial research suggests such linkages exist (Bruine de Bruin et al. 2007, Parker et al. 2015)....

  • Consequences of Age-Related Cognitive Declines

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  • Mindful Judgment and Decision Making

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    • .... de Bruin et al. (2007) also find the propensity to regret and tendency to maximize to be negatively related to the reported quality of decision outcomes and to decision-making competency, ...
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  • Treatment Selection in Depression

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  • Evidence-Based Practice: The Psychology of EBP Implementation

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    • ...as even relatively simple statistical models objectively outperform the most experienced practitioners (Clement 2013, Dawes et al. 1989)....
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  • The Admissibility of Behavioral Science Evidence in the Courtroom: The Translation of Legal to Scientific Concepts and Back

    David Faust ¹ , Paul W. Grimm ² , David C. Ahern ³ , and Mark Sokolik ^{4 1}Department of Psychology, University of Rhode Island, and Department of Psychiatry and Human Behavior, Warren Alpert Medical School of Brown University, Kingston, Rhode Island 02881; email: [email protected] ²United States District Court for the District of Maryland; University of Maryland School of Law; and University of Baltimore School of Law, Baltimore, Maryland 21201³Department of Psychology, University of Rhode Island, and Department of Psychiatry and Human Behavior, Warren Alpert Medical School of Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912⁴Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC 20001

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    • ...accuracy is far more likely to decline, sometimes substantially (see Dawes et al. 1989, Faust 2010b)....
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  • PROGNOSIS IN CRITICAL CARE

    Lucila Ohno-Machado, ^1,4 Frederic S. Resnic, ^1,2 and Michael E. Matheny ^{1,3,4 1}Decision Systems Group, Department of Radiology; ²Division of Cardiology, Department of Medicine; and ³Division of General Internal Medicine, Department of Medicine, Brigham and Women's Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts 02115; ⁴Division of Health Sciences and Technology, Harvard-MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

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    • ...There are a number of biases inherent in subjective estimates (156)....

  • Rationality

    Eldar Shafir and Robyn A. LeBoeufDepartment of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544; e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]

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    • ...and to the greater predictive success obtained by linear models of the human judge (Dawes 1979, Dawes et al. 1989, Swets et al. 2000)....
    • ...Dawes et al. (1989) concluded that actuarial decision making is often far superior to expert, ...

  • EXPERT AND EXCEPTIONAL PERFORMANCE: Evidence of Maximal Adaptation to Task Constraints

    K. A. Ericsson and A. C. LehmannDepartment of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida 32306-1051

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    • ...statistical regression models that combine a small number of cues usually available to experts nearly always outperform (or at least equal) expert judgment involving prediction (Dawes et al 1989)....

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    • ...The fitness consequences of different decisions can be compared using utility models developed in economics (Edwards 1954)....

  • Decision Making Across Adulthood

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    • ...Normative approaches are informed by economic theory as well as principles of rational choice (Edwards 1954, Yates 1990)....
    • ...Decision making was conceptualized as involving the examination of available information about possible options and then using reasoning skills to choose the option that maximized expected utility or decision makers' perceived likelihood of achieving their desired outcome (Edwards 1954)....
    • ...Normative theories specify four processes fundamental for making rational choices (Edwards 1954, Parker & Fischhoff 2005, Raiffa 1968)....

  • Queries on the Human Use of the Earth

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    • ...From it I was able to draw on and use new concepts of risk and probability (5), decision making under uncertainty (6), ...

  • Problems for Judgment and Decision Making

    R. HastiePsychology Department, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0345; e-mail: [email protected]

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    • ...Some of the earliest psychological contributions to decision making commented on this unrealistic interpretation (Edwards 1954)....

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  • On p-Values and Bayes Factors

    Leonhard Held and Manuela OttEpidemiology, Biostatistics and Prevention Institute, University of Zurich, CH-8001 Zurich, Switzerland; email: [email protected], [email protected]

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    • ...One of the first papers with a systematic comparison of p-values and the corresponding minimum Bayes factors was published in the 1960s (Edwards et al. 1963), ...
    • ...Edwards et al. (1963, p. 226) "examine one situation in which classical statistics prescribes a [...] t test," but in fact consider what is usually called a z-test for large samples (Bland 2015...
    • ...Let t denote the value of the test statistic t=(y−θ₀)/σ. Edwards et al. (1963) observed that—for all possible prior densities f(θ|H ₁) on θ under H ₁—the Bayes factor for H ₀ against H ₁, ...
    • ...the place most favored by the data" (Edwards et al. 1963, ...
    • ...it is not clear how a p-value p should be transformed to the test statistic t. Edwards et al. (1963, ...
    • ...Another important case considered by Edwards et al. (1963) is a local normal prior for the mean θ of y∼N(θ, ...
    • ...Edwards et al. (1963) compare p-values of 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 with a selection of minimum Bayes factors. Table 3 provides a similar list with the minimum Bayes factors discussed so far, ...
    • ...Table inspired by table 4 in Edwards et al. (1963)....

  • Partitioning the Domain of Social Inference: Dual Mode and Systems Models and Their Alternatives

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    • ...Experimental research on decisions from experience documents a deviation from the optimal choice process that can be described as a tendency to rely on relatively small samples of recent outcomes (Barron & Erev 2003, Hertwig et al. 2004)....

  • Contributions to Defined Contribution Pension Plans

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  • Mindful Judgment and Decision Making

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    • ...behavioral studies dealt serious blows to the rational actor model (Kahneman 2011)....

  • Psychology of Transnational Terrorism and Extreme Political Conflict

    Scott Atran ^{1,2,3 1}Changing Character of War Centre and Centre for the Study of Social Cohesion, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 1DW, United Kingdom; email: [email protected] ²Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy and Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109, USA; email: [email protected] ³Artis International, Scottsdale, Arizona 85254, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 72: 471 - 501

    • ..., or other motivational biases (Kunda 1990) and ecological constraints (Kahneman 2011)....

  • Understanding Human Cognitive Uniqueness

    Kevin Laland ¹ and Amanda Seed ^{2 1}School of Biology, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews KY16 9ST, United Kingdom; email: [email protected] ²School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews KY16 9JP, United Kingdom

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 72: 689 - 716

    • ...They include high-level cognitive processes (aka System 2 thinking; see Kahneman 2011), ...

  • Integrating Models of Self-Regulation

    Michael Inzlicht, ¹ Kaitlyn M. Werner, ¹ Julia L. Briskin, ² and Brent W. Roberts ^{2 1} Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G3, Canada; email: [email protected] ² Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois 61820, USA

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 72: 319 - 345

    • ...dual systems models of self-regulation remain more popular than ever (Cohen 2017, Heatherton & Wagner 2011, Hofmann et al. 2009, Kahneman 2011, Metcalfe & Mischel 1999, Thaler & Shefrin 1981)....
    • ...some versions of which suggest that behavior is determined by some battle between hot emotion and cold cognition (Kahneman 2011)....

  • The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters: How and When Biased Input Shapes Mathematics Learning

    Robert S. Siegler, ^1,2 Soo-hyun Im, ³ Lauren K. Schiller, ¹ Jing Tian, ⁴ and David W. Braithwaite ^{5 1}Department of Human Development, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA; email: [email protected], [email protected] ²The Siegler Center for Innovative Learning (SCIL), Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, China³Department of Education, Hanyang University, Seoul 04763, South Korea; email: [email protected] ⁴Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122, USA; email: [email protected] ⁵Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida 32306, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Developmental Psychology Vol. 2: 413 - 435

    • ...The functions served by goal sketches resemble those of the System 2 reasoning described by Stanovich & West (2000) and Kahneman (2011), ...

  • Climate Decision-Making

    Ben Orlove, ¹ Rachael Shwom, ² Ezra Markowitz, ³ and So-Min Cheong ^{4 1}School of International and Public Affairs and Earth Institute, Columbia University, New York, New York 10025, USA; email: [email protected] ²Department of Human Ecology and Rutgers Energy Institute, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08901, USA; email: [email protected] ³Department of Environmental Conservation, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, Massachusetts 01002, USA; email: [email protected] ⁴Department of Geography and Atmospheric Science, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66045, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 45: 271 - 303

    • ...which differ from rational optimization of outcomes; the wide influence of this research was signaled by the awarding of the Nobel Prize in economics to the psychologist Daniel Kahneman in 2002 and by broad popularity of books on this topic in the following years (7, 8)....
    • ...involving faster and more emotional decision-making utilizing heuristics and biases (8)....
    • ...multi-criteria decision analysis has been used to help decision-makers balance competing goals of managing water resources under climate change and urbanization or developing energy policy (8, 30)....

  • Employer Decision Making

    Lauren A. RiveraDepartment of Management and Organizations, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 46: 215 - 232

    • ...and environments—are central to the decisions they make (Castilla 2011, Fox & Spector 2000, Goldberg 2005, Kahneman 2011, Staw et al. 1994, Tsui & Gutek 1999)....
    • ...Factors in addition to perceived quality or organizational goals play vital roles in how people evaluate and select between alternatives (see Dijksterhuis 2010, Kahneman 2011)....
    • ...they are more likely to rely on stereotypes and other types of cognitive heuristics and less likely to make accurate decisions (Kahneman 2011)....

  • Self-Control and Crime: Beyond Gottfredson & Hirschi's Theory

    Callie H. BurtDepartment of Criminal Justice and Criminology and Center for Research on Interpersonal Violence, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia 30303, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Criminology Vol. 3: 43 - 73

    • ....⁸ Emotionally charged situations seem to alter or hijack our normal (cool) reasoning capacities (e.g., Kahneman 2011, Mischel et al. 1973)....

  • Has Dynamic Programming Improved Decision Making?

    John RustDepartment of Economics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 11: 833 - 858

    • ...Kahneman 2011) as well as limited reasoning/computational capacity can cause us to make suboptimal choices, ...

  • Partisan Bias in Surveys

    John G. Bullock ¹ and Gabriel Lenz ^{2 1}Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208, USA; email: [email protected] ²Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 22: 325 - 342

    • ...rather than directional motives, may underpin many cognitive biases (Kahneman 2003; 2011, ...

  • Better Government, Better Science: The Promise of and Challenges Facing the Evidence-Informed Policy Movement

    Jake Bowers ¹ and Paul F. Testa ^{2 1}Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois 61801, USA; email: [email protected] ²Department of Political Science, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 22: 521 - 542

    • ... ⁷Many of these concepts are often situated within more general dual-system theories of human cognition that distinguish between forms of cognition that are "fast" (System 1) and "slow" (System 2) (Stanovich & West 2000, Kahneman 2011)...

  • Positive Psychology: A Personal History

    Martin E.P. SeligmanPositive Psychology Center, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104, USA; email: [email protected]

    

    Annual Review of Clinical Psychology Vol. 15: 1 - 23

    • ...In its modern cognitive incarnation, the elimination-of-errors school, led perhaps unwittingly by Danny Kahneman (2011), ...

  • Mechanisms of Sensory Discrimination: Insights from Drosophila Olfaction

    Lukas N. Groschner and Gero MiesenböckCentre for Neural Circuits and Behavior, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3SR, United Kingdom; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Biophysics Vol. 48: 209 - 229

    • ...The roles of these structures in odor discrimination bring to mind Kahneman's Systems 1 and 2 (72)....

  • Statistical Models of Key Components of Wildfire Risk

    Dexen D.Z. Xi, ¹ Stephen W. Taylor, ² Douglas G. Woolford, ¹ and C.B. Dean ^{3 1}Department of Statistical and Actuarial Sciences, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario N6A 5B7, Canada; email: [email protected], [email protected] ²Pacific Forestry Centre, Natural Resources Canada, Victoria, British Columbia V8Z 1M5, Canada; email: [email protected] ³Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1, Canada; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Statistics and Its Application Vol. 6: 197 - 222

    • ...rational decision processes (e.g., Kahneman 2011) and have a healthy skepticism of models....

  • Perspectives of a Practitioner-Scientist on Organizational Psychology/Organizational Behavior

    Gary P. LathamRotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6, Canada; email: [email protected]

    

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 6: 1 - 16

    • ...The danger of deductive theory building, as noted by Kahneman (2011, ...

  • From Nudge to Culture and Back Again: Coalface Governance in the Regulated Organization

    Ruthanne Huising ¹ and Susan S. Silbey ^{2 1}Emlyon Business School, 69130 Écully, France; email: [email protected] ²Department of Anthropology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Law and Social Science Vol. 14: 91 - 114

    • ... prize-winning psychological research and Kahneman's (2011) more recent extensions documenting the persistent nonrational biases of human decision making....
    • ...They are more common in what Kahneman (2011) calls system 1 or fast thinking, ...

  • A Life in Food: A Grain of Salt and Some Humble Pie

    Michael J. GibneyInstitute of Food and Health, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland; email: [email protected]

    

    Annual Review of Nutrition Vol. 38: 1 - 16

    • ...The Nobel Laureate in economics Daniel Kahneman (19) is best known for his work on how we make decisions and form opinions....

  • Economics of Child Protection: Maltreatment, Foster Care, and Intimate Partner Violence

    Joseph J. Doyle, Jr. ^1,2 and Anna Aizer ^{2,3 1}Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142, USA; email: [email protected] ²National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA³Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912, USA

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 10: 87 - 108

    • ...The former might include what Kahneman (2011) describes as a two-tiered model of cognition: The first level is fast, ...

  • Offender Decision-Making in Criminology: Contributions from Behavioral Economics

    Greg Pogarsky, ¹ Sean Patrick Roche, ² and Justin T. Pickett ^{1 1}School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany-SUNY, Albany, New York 12222, USA; email: [email protected] ²School of Criminal Justice, Texas State University, San Marcos, Texas 78666, USA

    Annual Review of Criminology Vol. 1: 379 - 400

    • ...—Kahneman 2011, pp. 274–75...
    • ... pioneered insights that led to Expected Utility Theory, which Kahneman (2011, ...
    • ...three works exemplify some more recent advancements (Dhami 2016, Kahneman 2011, Thaler 2015)....
    • ...One in particular, Thinking, Fast and Slow by Kahneman (2011), elaborates the dual-process nature of behavioral economics....
    • ...It provides constant and near instantaneous answers to the questions in daily life (Kahneman 2011)....
    • ...which then becomes the basis for a person's judgment or belief (Kahneman 2011)....
    • ...in turn making humans prone to systemic biases (Kahneman 2011, Thaler 2015)....
    • ...These types of shortcuts deal with inherently uncertain environments where expertise is difficult to gather (Kahneman 2011)....
    • ...Premised on evidence that the use of heuristics means "[p]eople overestimate the probabilities of unlikely events" (Kahneman 2011, ...

  • Decision-Making Processes in Social Contexts

    Elizabeth Bruch ¹ and Fred Feinberg ^{2 1}Department of Sociology and Complex Systems, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104; email: [email protected] ²Ross School of Business and Department of Statistics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 43: 207 - 227

    • ...and another that is slow, analytical, deliberate, and verbal (Evans 2008, Kahneman 2011)....

  • Culture, Politics, and Economic Development

    Paul CollierBlavatnik School of Government, Oxford University, Oxford OX2 6GG, United Kingdom; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 20: 111 - 125

    • ...has primarily explored generic biases in decisions that could have arisen from evolutionary processes, such as fast thinking (Kahneman 2011), ...

  • Field Experiments in Organizations

    Dov EdenColler School of Management, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 6997801, Israel; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 4: 91 - 122

    • ...It is hard to refrain from causal thinking. Kahneman's (2011) System 1 thinking, ...

  • Decision Analysis for Management of Natural Hazards

    Michael Simpson, ¹ Rachel James, ¹ Jim W. Hall, ¹ Edoardo Borgomeo, ¹ Matthew C. Ives, ¹ Susana Almeida, ² Ashley Kingsborough, ¹ Theo Economou, ³ David Stephenson, ³ and Thorsten Wagener ^{2,4 1}Environmental Change Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3QY, United Kingdom; email: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] ²Department of Civil Engineering, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1TR, United Kingdom; email: [email protected], [email protected] ³Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Exeter, Exeter EX4 4QF, United Kingdom; email: [email protected], [email protected] ⁴Cabot Institute, Royal Fort House, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1UJ, United Kingdom

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 41: 489 - 516

    • ...Kahneman (8) has argued that prospect theory should not be used for normative decision making, ...

  • Preference Change in Competitive Political Environments

    James N. Druckman ¹ and Arthur Lupia ^{2 1}Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208; email: [email protected] ²Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 19: 13 - 31

    • ...the role of science is obvious: Science is our best guide to developing factual understandings" (see also Kahneman 2011, ...

  • Charisma: An Ill-Defined and Ill-Measured Gift

    John Antonakis, ¹ Nicolas Bastardoz, ¹ Philippe Jacquart, ² and Boas Shamir ^{3, 1}Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Organizational Behavior, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland; email: [email protected], [email protected] ²EMLYON Business School, 69134 Ecully, France; email: [email protected] ³Department of Sociology and Anthropology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel 91905

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 3: 293 - 319

    • ...assuming what successful cases have in common drives their success without having compared these cases to a control group (Denrell 2003)—or (b) regression to the mean (Kahneman 2011), ...

  • The Social Context of Decisions

    Richard P. LarrickFuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 3: 441 - 467

    • ...There has been an explosion of academic research on decision making in recent decades (Kahneman 2011, Thaler & Sunstein 2008)....
    • ...Behavioral decision research has identified numerous systematic limitations in rationality and has offered a rich understanding of the actual cognitive processes that guide decisions (Kahneman 2011)...
    • .... Kahneman (2011) summarized this view in the title of his best-selling book, ...
    • ...Tversky and Kahneman's great contribution was identifying a core set of cognitive processes that guide (and distort) decision making (see Kahneman 2011 for a review)....
    • ...Beginning with Simon (1955) through to the present (Kahneman 2011), a deep understanding has emerged of how individual decision makers are not rational but guided by systematic cognitive tendencies....

  • The Nonconscious at Work

    Michael G. Pratt and Eliana CrosinaCarroll School of Management, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02467; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 3: 321 - 347

    • ...p. 710). Kahneman (2011) argues that this approach delineates between two core processes of thought: automatic and controlled, ...
    • ...with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control," whereas System 2 "allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations" (Kahneman 2011, ...

  • Stumbling Toward a Social Psychology of Organizations: An Autobiographical Look at the Direction of Organizational Research

    Barry M. StawHaas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720; email: [email protected]

    

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 3: 1 - 19

  • Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Quality of Health Care

    Kevin Fiscella and Mechelle R. SandersDepartments of Family Medicine and Public Health Sciences, University of Rochester Medical Center, Rochester, New York 14620; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Public Health Vol. 37: 375 - 394

    • ...These decisions reflect different cognitive processes (81)....
    • ...Various types of cognitive bias affect human decision making (81)....

  • Making Healthy Choices Easier: Regulation versus Nudging

    Pelle Guldborg Hansen, ^1,2 Laurits Rohden Skov, ³ and Katrine Lund Skov ^{4 1}Communication, Business and Information Technology,²Center for Science, Society and Policy, Roskilde University, 4000 Roskilde, Denmark; email: [email protected] ³Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg University, 9100 Aalborg, Denmark; email: [email protected] ⁴Danish Nudging Network, 1208 København K, Denmark; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Public Health Vol. 37: 237 - 251

    • ... as made accessible to the wider public by Kahneman's (31) dual-system theory presented in his book, ...

  • The Council of Psychological Advisers

    Cass R. SunsteinHarvard Law School, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 67: 713 - 737

    • ...reducing their own well-being in the process (Kahneman 2011, Thaler & Sunstein 2008)....

  • Evidence-Based Practice: The Psychology of EBP Implementation

    Denise M. Rousseau ¹ and Brian C. Gunia ^{2 1}Heinz College of Public Policy, Information, and Management and Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213; email: [email protected] ²Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-1099; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 67: 667 - 692

    • ...One research stream substantiates the fallibility of experience-based decisions due to cognitive biases and processing limitations—factors that even sustained practice cannot easily overcome (Dawes 2008, Kahneman 2011)....

  • Behavioral Finance

    David HirshleiferMerage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, California 92697; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 7: 133 - 159

    • ...more effortful system monitors and revises such judgments as time and circumstances permit (Stanovich 1999, Kahneman 2011)....
    • ...I refer to the fast process as the intuitive system and the slow process as the reasoning system. Kahneman (2011) describes human thinking as largely intuitive and heavily influenced by the associations that are triggered by the presentation of a decision problem....

  • Inclusive Wealth as a Metric of Sustainable Development

    Stephen Polasky, ^1,2, Benjamin Bryant, ³ Peter Hawthorne, ² Justin Johnson, ² Bonnie Keeler, ² and Derric Pennington ^{2,4 1}Department of Applied Economics,²Natural Capital Project, Institute on the Environment, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota 55108; email: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] ³Natural Capital Project, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305; email: [email protected] ⁴World Wildlife Fund, Washington, DC 20037; email; [email protected]

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 40: 445 - 466

    • ...Many empirical studies have found systematic deviations between the type of rational agent assumed in economic models and the often seemingly irrational behavior of real people (77...

  • Transforming Consumption: From Decoupling, to Behavior Change, to System Changes for Sustainable Consumption

    Dara O'Rourke ¹ and Niklas Lollo ^{2 1}Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management,²Energy and Resources Group, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, 94720; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 40: 233 - 259

    • ...A now well accepted conclusion of this research (93, 94) is that individuals are not fully rational actors (partly explaining the ineffectiveness of information provision)....

  • Linguistic Relativity from Reference to Agency

    N.J. EnfieldThe University of Sydney, Department of Linguistics, NSW 2006, Australia; email: [email protected]Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, 6500 AH Nijmegen, The Netherlands

    Annual Review of Anthropology Vol. 44: 207 - 224

    • ...; compare Gigerenzer 2007, Kahneman 2011): Do not waste your time studying all the options; simply settle on the first solution that is good enough for current purposes and stop the search....

  • The Brain's Default Mode Network

    Marcus E. RaichleWashington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, Missouri 63110; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Neuroscience Vol. 38: 433 - 447

    • ...These opposing forces are captured nicely in the book by Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Kahneman 2011)....

  • Organizational Routines as Patterns of Action: Implications for Organizational Behavior

    Brian T. Pentland ¹ and Thorvald Hærem ^{2 1}Eli Broad College of Business, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824; email: [email protected] ²Department of Leadership and Organizational Behaviour, BI Norwegian Business School, NO-0442 Oslo, Norway; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 2: 465 - 487

    • ...in which the paradigmatic research design includes copresent human individuals engaged in a single decision (e.g., Kahneman 2011, Plous 1993)....
    • ...we turn to concepts from behavioral decision making (Kahneman 2011, Plous 1993, Simon 1959, Winter 2013)....
    • ...Dual-process models hold that intuition and analysis are parallel and interactive modes of information processing that are served by separate cognitive systems, System 1 and System 2 (Kahneman 2011, Stanovich & West 2000)....
    • ...The behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March 1963) and theories of behavioral decision making (Kahneman 2011) are, ...
    • ...but the behavioral decision research paradigm focuses on single decisions taken in isolation from other actions or decisions (Bromiley 2010, Kahneman 2011, Kahneman & Klein 2009, Sleesman et al. 2012)....

  • The Evolutionary Roots of Human Decision Making

    Laurie R. Santos and Alexandra G. RosatiDepartment of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06511; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 66: 321 - 347

    • ...we consistently attend too much to irrelevant information (see reviews in Kahneman 2011), ...
    • ...Decades of research in judgment and decision making have revealed that human choices are routinely subject to framing: We tend to view choice options not in absolute terms but rather relative to salient reference points (for a review, see Kahneman 2011)....
    • ...capuchins exhibited qualitatively similar framing effects as human tested in similar framing studies (Kahneman 2011, Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1981)....

  • Consumer Acceptance of New Food Technologies: Causes and Roots of Controversies

    Jayson L. Lusk, ¹ Jutta Roosen, ² and Andrea Bieberstein ^{2 1}Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma 74078²TUM School of Management, Technische Universität München, 85350 Freising-Weihenstephan, Germany; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 6: 381 - 405

    • ... and Kahneman (2011) discuss research surrounding the affect heuristic and the risk-as-feeling hypothesis....
    • ...When talking about the heuristic, Kahneman (2011, p. 138) argues that "[t]he world in our heads is not a precise replica of reality; our expectations about the frequency of events are distorted by the prevalence and emotional intensity of the messages to which we are exposed." Media can frame food technologies by (a) emotionalizing an issue and (b) repetitive messaging, ...
    • ...making the issue readily available in people's memory (i.e., activating the availability heuristic). Kahneman (2011, ...

  • Making Sense of Culture

    Orlando PattersonDepartment of Sociology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; email: [email protected]

    

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 40: 1 - 30

    • ...and meaning in human actions and interactions and meet certain core social motives such as belonging and self-enhancement without imposing undue burden on the limited and chronically "lazy" (Kahneman 2011, ...
    • ...and classes we use to make sense of reality and are one of the most basic features of automatic cognitive processing (Kahneman 2011, ...
    • ...The first is the provision of as much possible information with the least possible cognitive effort: "[T]he perceived world comes as structured information rather than as arbitrary or unpredictable attributes" (Rosch 1978, pp. 28–30; Kahneman 2011, ...
    • ...although they can also mislead and misjudge (Pinker 1997, pp. 306–13; Kahneman 2011, ...
    • ...Our capacity to categorize is foundational to the basic elements of cultural knowledge: schemata and mental models (see, e.g., D'Andrade & Strauss 1992; D'Andrade 1995; DiMaggio 1997; Kahneman 2011, ...

  • Emotion and Decision Making: Multiple Modulatory Neural Circuits

    Elizabeth A. Phelps, ^1,2,3 Karolina M. Lempert, ¹ and Peter Sokol-Hessner ^{1,2 1}Department of Psychology,²Center for Neural Science, New York University, New York, NY 10003;³Nathan Kline Institute, Orangeburg, New York, NY 10963; email: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Neuroscience Vol. 37: 263 - 287

    • ...with emotion as one of the factors contributing to the more automatic, less deliberative system 1 (Kahneman 2011)....
    • ...The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration" (Kahneman 2011, ...
    • ...The view that value and emotion are inherently intertwined is more common among psychologists and neuroscientists (e.g., Rolls & Grabenhorst 2008) than economists (e.g., Kahneman 2011), ...

  • Actionable Knowledge for Environmental Decision Making: Broadening the Usability of Climate Science

    Christine J. Kirchhoff, ¹ Maria Carmen Lemos, ¹ and Suraje Dessai ^{2 1}School of Natural Resources and Environment, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1041; email: [email protected], [email protected] ²Sustainability Research Institute and ESRC Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, United Kingdom; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 38: 393 - 414

    • ...with attention and awareness of rules such as logic and probabilities) or experientially (fast and relating to emotion and experiences and learning from them) affect their perception of risk and influence their use of information (109)....

  • The Behavioral Economics of Health and Health Care

    Thomas RiceDepartment of Health Policy and Management, Fielding School of Public Health, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90095-1772; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Public Health Vol. 34: 431 - 447

    • ...An excellent and up-to-date summary and synthesis of research that forms the core of behavioral economics can be found in Kahneman (25)....
    • ...The phenomenon is illustrated by the following experiment, as reported by Kahneman (25)....
    • ...the price goes up, and when they buy stock, it goes down (25)....

  • Law, Environment, and the "Nondismal" Social Sciences

    William Boyd, ¹ Douglas A. Kysar, ² and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ^{3 1}University of Colorado Law School, Boulder, Colorado 80309; email: [email protected] ²Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut 06511; email: [email protected] ³Cornell University Law School, Ithaca, New York 14853; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Law and Social Science Vol. 8: 183 - 211

    • ...Kahneman (2011) has argued that people generally rely on two systems of reasoning in making decisions—an intuitive system that is dominated by heuristics and emotion and a rational system that produces judgments that are largely consistent with rational choice....

  • Payments for Environmental Services: Evolution Toward Efficient and Fair Incentives for Multifunctional Landscapes

    Meine van Noordwijk, ¹ Beria Leimona, ¹ Rohit Jindal, ² Grace B. Villamor, ^1,3 Mamta Vardhan, ⁴ Sara Namirembe, ⁵ Delia Catacutan, ⁶ John Kerr, ⁷ Peter A. Minang, ⁵ and Thomas P. Tomich ^{8 1}World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), Bogor 16880, Indonesia; email: [email protected], [email protected] ²Department of Resource Economics and Environmental Sociology, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2H1; email: [email protected] ³Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn, Germany 53113; email: [email protected] ⁴Institute for Sustainable Energy, Environment and Economy, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4; email: [email protected] ⁵World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), Nairobi 00100, Kenya; email: [email protected], a.min[email protected] ⁶World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), Hanoi, Vietnam; email: [email protected] ⁷Department of Community, Agriculture, Recreation and Resource Studies, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824; email: [email protected] ⁸Agricultural Sustainability Institute, University of California, Davis, California 95616-8523; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 37: 389 - 420

    • ...direct "system 1" that seeks immediate rewards (9) and dominated in our hunter-gatherer history....
    • ...complementing the system 1 and system 2 functions, which had much more time to evolve (9)....
    • ... interact with three subsystems of the human brain [system 1 and system 2 of Kahneman (9) plus a system 3 shaping and responding to social norms], ...
    • ...As discussed by Kahneman (9), current understanding of human decision making on the picoeconomic to microeconomic interface across the intuitive, ...

• 74.

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  • Toward the Next Generation of Assessment

    Katharine J. Mach ¹ and Christopher B. Field ^{2 1}Department of Earth System Science, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305; email: [email protected] ²Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 42: 569 - 597

    • ...embracing multiple approaches can improve evaluation of diverse hypotheses, perspectives, and outcomes (59, 65...

  • Evidence-Based Practice: The Psychology of EBP Implementation

    Denise M. Rousseau ¹ and Brian C. Gunia ^{2 1}Heinz College of Public Policy, Information, and Management and Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213; email: [email protected] ²Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland 21202-1099; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 67: 667 - 692

    • ...which in turn requires feedback that is prompt, information rich, and consistent (Kahneman & Klein 2009)....

  • Organizational Routines as Patterns of Action: Implications for Organizational Behavior

    Brian T. Pentland ¹ and Thorvald Hærem ^{2 1}Eli Broad College of Business, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824; email: [email protected] ²Department of Leadership and Organizational Behaviour, BI Norwegian Business School, NO-0442 Oslo, Norway; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 2: 465 - 487

    • ...we argue that concepts from heuristic information processing (Evans 2008, Gigerenzer 2000, Gigerenzer & Todd 1999, Hogarth 2001, Kahneman & Klein 2009, Simon 1987) may provide more precise microfoundations for organizational routines....
    • ...in traditional decision-making research (e.g., Gigerenzer 2000, Kahneman & Klein 2009, Tversky & Kahneman 1974, Whyte 1989), ...
    • ...it would not be surprising if simplifying heuristics (Kahneman & Klein 2009) were involved in processing the information cues....
    • ...as long as the heuristics are ecologically valid. Kahneman & Klein (2009) try to bridge the two views by discussing the concept of ecological validity of heuristics, ...
    • ...Kahneman & Klein (2009) discuss the value of ecologically valid cues and skilled intuition....
    • ...Simplifying heuristics are of main interest for the heuristics and bias research paradigm (Kahneman & Klein 2009)....
    • ...but the behavioral decision research paradigm focuses on single decisions taken in isolation from other actions or decisions (Bromiley 2010, Kahneman 2011, Kahneman & Klein 2009, Sleesman et al. 2012)....

• 75.

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  • Discounting and Global Environmental Change

    Stephen Polasky ^1,2,3 and Nfamara K. Dampha ^{3,4 1}Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota 55108, USA; email: [email protected] ²Department of Ecology, Evolution and Behavior, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota 55108, USA³Institute on the Environment, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota 55108, USA; email: [email protected] ⁴World Bank-UNHCR Joint Data Center, Washington, DC 20433, USA

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 46: 691 - 717

    • ...Other theories, such as prospect theory (67), treat gains and losses differently, ...

  • Decision Making Across Adulthood

    JoNell Strough ¹ and Wändi Bruine de Bruin ^{2 1}Department of Psychology, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia 26506, USA; email: [email protected] ²Sol Price School of Public Policy, Dornsife Department of Psychology, Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics, and Center for Economic and Social Research, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-0626, USA

    Annual Review of Developmental Psychology Vol. 2: 345 - 363

    • ...referred to as biases and errors (Kahneman 2003, Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1974)....

  • Gun Studies and the Politics of Evidence

    Jennifer CarlsonSchool of Sociology and School of Government & Public Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Law and Social Science Vol. 16: 183 - 202

    • ... ³Note that this study is embedded in a vast literature on risk that spans a range of disciplines, including anthropology (e.g., Douglas 2003), psychology (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1979), ...

  • The Microeconomics of Agricultural Price Risk

    Chris M. Boyd ¹ and Marc F. Bellemare ^{1,2 1}Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, Saint Paul, Minnesota 55108, USA; email: [email protected], [email protected] ²Center for International Food and Agricultural Policy, University of Minnesota, Saint Paul, Minnesota 55108, USA

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 12: 149 - 169

    • ...there is a need for developing price risk theories among frameworks beyond expected utility theory, such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • Recent Advances in the Analyses of Demand for Agricultural Insurance in Developing and Emerging Countries

    Williams Ali, ¹ Awudu Abdulai, ¹ and Ashok K. Mishra ^{2 1}Department of Food Economics and Consumption Studies, University of Kiel, 24118 Kiel, Germany; email: [email protected] ²Morrison School of Agribusiness, W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85212, USA

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 12: 411 - 430

    • ...Kahneman & Tversky (1979) concluded that to the extent that the disutility from avoiding losses is higher than the utility from gaining the same amount, ...

  • Modeling Imprecision in Perception, Valuation, and Choice

    Michael WoodfordDepartment of Economics, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 12: 579 - 601

    • ... show how biases in the perceived probability of different outcomes of the kind postulated by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) can result from Bayesian decoding of noisy internal representations of the probabilities presented to the experimental subject....

  • Aspirations and Economic Behavior

    Garance Genicot ¹ and Debraj Ray ^{2,3 1}Department of Economics, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057, USA; email: [email protected] ²Department of Economics, New York University, New York, NY 10012, USA; email: [email protected] ³Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 12: 715 - 746

    • ...for example, the prospect theory approach developed by Kahneman & Tversky (1979), ...
    • ...as in the literature on reference points or habit formation (see, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky 1979...

  • Regulatory Focus and Fit Effects in Organizations

    E. Tory Higgins and Federica PinelliDepartment of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 7: 25 - 48

    • ...But they are not risk seeking in the domain of losses, as prospect theory might suggest (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • The Culminating Crisis of American Sociology and Its Role in Social Science and Public Policy: An Autobiographical, Multimethod, Reflexive Perspective

    James S. HouseSurvey Research Center, Ford School of Public Policy, and Department of Sociology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104; email: [email protected]

    

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 45: 1 - 26

    • ...Psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) also made special, ...

  • Better Government, Better Science: The Promise of and Challenges Facing the Evidence-Informed Policy Movement

    Jake Bowers ¹ and Paul F. Testa ^{2 1}Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois 61801, USA; email: [email protected] ²Department of Political Science, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 22: 521 - 542

    • ...The early work on decision making within psychology (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky 1979)...
    • ..., and time-inconsistent preferences (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Pronin et al. 2008)....

  • A Perspective on Incentive Design: Challenges and Opportunities

    Lillian J. Ratliff, ¹ Roy Dong, ² Shreyas Sekar, ¹ and Tanner Fiez ^{1 1}Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195, USA; email: [email protected] ²Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois 61801, USA

    Annual Review of Control, Robotics, and Autonomous Systems Vol. 2: 305 - 338

    • ...This occurs because the congestion pricing tariffs do not take into account the time–money trade-offs among users and because drivers become acclimated to the increased prices [e.g., due to anchoring bias (89)]....
    • ...such schemes may achieve the unintended effect of raising home prices inside the congestion zone because residents pay higher prices to avoid road taxes [e.g., due to loss aversion (89)...
    • ...Such nonlinear utilities are a core component of the famed prospect theory (89, 91)....

  • Television News Coverage of Public Health Issues and Implications for Public Health Policy and Practice

    Sarah E. Gollust, ¹ Erika Franklin Fowler, ² and Jeff Niederdeppe ^{3 1}Division of Health Policy and Management, School of Public Health, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455, USA; email: [email protected] ²Government Department, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut 06459, USA; email: [email protected] ³Department of Communication, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853-4301, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Public Health Vol. 40: 167 - 185

    • ...2 out of 10 people will die versus 8 out of 10 people will live) (61, 62)....

  • Marketing as a Risk Management Mechanism with Applications in Agriculture, Resources, and Food Management

    Amir Heiman ¹ and Lutz Hildebrandt ^{2 1}Department of Environmental Economics and Management and the Center for Agricultural Economics Research, Robert H. Smith Faculty of Agriculture, Food and Environment, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Rehovot 7610001, Israel; email: [email protected] ²School of Business and Economics, Humboldt University, Berlin D-10099, Germany

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 10: 253 - 277

    • ...who are likely to be risk averse (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)...

  • Anxiety, Depression, and Decision Making: A Computational Perspective

    Sonia J. Bishop ^1,2 and Christopher Gagne ^{1 1}Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720, USA; email: [email protected] ²Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720, USA

    Annual Review of Neuroscience Vol. 41: 371 - 388

    • ...people vary in the subjective valuation of outcomes and the relative weighting of outcome probability and outcome value (i.e., risk aversion) (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • How to Think About Social Identity

    Michael Kalin ¹ and Nicholas Sambanis ^{2 1}Department of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520, USA; email: [email protected] ²Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 21: 239 - 257

    • ...which seeks to systematically explain when and how individuals depart from the expectations of neoclassical economic models (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1974)....

  • International Negotiation: Some Conceptual Developments

    Barry O'NeillDepartment of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90095, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 21: 515 - 533

    • .... Kahneman & Tversky (1979) integrated some of these into what they called "prospect theory," intended as a more empirically based version of utility theory....

  • Person–Environment Fit: A Review of Its Basic Tenets

    Annelies E.M. van VianenDepartment of Work and Organizational Psychology, University of Amsterdam, 1001 NK Amsterdam, Netherlands; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 5: 75 - 101

    • ...Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) and regulatory focus theory (Higgins 1997)...
    • ...Prospect and regulatory focus theories (Higgins 1997, Kahneman & Tversky 1979) may help to explain how individuals will respond to different types of misfits, ...

  • Offender Decision-Making in Criminology: Contributions from Behavioral Economics

    Greg Pogarsky, ¹ Sean Patrick Roche, ² and Justin T. Pickett ^{1 1}School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany-SUNY, Albany, New York 12222, USA; email: [email protected] ²School of Criminal Justice, Texas State University, San Marcos, Texas 78666, USA

    Annual Review of Criminology Vol. 1: 379 - 400

    • ...Adapted from Kahneman & Tversky (1979) with permission....
    • ...increments of probability at the endpoints of the continuum tend to influence decisions more than nominally equivalent increments toward the middle of the continuum do (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). ...
    • ...Adapted from Kahneman & Tversky (1979) with permission....
    • ...Although prospect theory is the seminal, early statement of behavioral economics (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), ...

  • Perceived Self-Efficacy, Poverty, and Economic Development

    David Wuepper ¹ and Travis J. Lybbert ^{2 1}Department of Agricultural Economics, Technical University Munich, 85354 Freising, Germany; email: [email protected] ²Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis, California 95616

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 9: 383 - 404

    • ...individuals are risk-takers to achieve their aspirations because every realization below their aspiration is perceived as loss (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • Asking Willingness-to-Accept Questions in Stated Preference Surveys: A Review and Research Agenda

    Dale Whittington, ^1,2 Wiktor Adamowicz, ³ and Patrick Lloyd-Smith ^{3 1}Department of Environmental Sciences and Engineering and Department of City and Regional Planning, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27559; email: [email protected] ²Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9SS, United Kingdom³Department of Resource Economics and Environmental Sociology, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2P5, Canada

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 9: 317 - 336

    • ...the interpretation of the WTA–WTP discrepancy has changed.² The challenges of asking WTA questions have not disappeared, but the finding of Kahneman & Tversky (1979)...
    • ...This perspective has arisen from the conceptual and empirical work in this area (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Knetsch 2010, Kőszegi & Rabin 2006)....

  • Agricultural Insurance and Economic Development

    Shawn A. Cole ¹ and Wentao Xiong ^{2 1}Finance Unit, Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts 02163; email: [email protected] ²Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 9: 235 - 262

    • ...individuals' psychological or behavioral biases often discourage adoption. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) demonstrate that, ...
    • ...The prospect theory of Kahneman & Tversky (1979) proposes that individuals tend to conduct probability weighting and overweight low probabilities when making decisions under uncertainty. Barseghyan et al. (2013)...

  • Decision-Making Processes in Social Contexts

    Elizabeth Bruch ¹ and Fred Feinberg ^{2 1}Department of Sociology and Complex Systems, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104; email: [email protected] ²Ross School of Business and Department of Statistics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 43: 207 - 227

    • ...From Daniel Kahneman's 2002 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for his work on heuristics and biases (Kahneman & Tversky 1979...
    • ...where the outcome is probabilistic and the payoff probabilities are known (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, 1982, 1984), ...

  • Progovernment Militias

    Sabine C. Carey ¹ and Neil J. Mitchell ^{2 1}School of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, D-68159 Mannheim, Germany; email: [email protected] ²School of Public Policy, University College London, London WC1H 9QU, United Kingdom; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 20: 127 - 147

    • ..."the tendency to bet on long shots increases in the course of the betting day" (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, ...

  • Climate Change and International Relations (After Kyoto)

    Arild Underdal ^{1,2 1}Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Oslo 0317, Norway; email: [email protected] ²Center for International Climate and Environmental Research—Oslo (CICERO), Oslo 0318, Norway

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 20: 169 - 188

    • ...Experimental research indicates that—even for events occurring simultaneously—most people are inclined to react more strongly to the prospect of a given loss than to the prospect of an equally large gain (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • Impact of Provider Incentives on Quality and Value of Health Care

    Tim Doran, ¹ Kristin A. Maurer, ² and Andrew M. Ryan ^{2 1}Department of Health Sciences, University of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD, United Kingdom; email: [email protected] ²Department of Health Management and Policy, School of Public Health, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Public Health Vol. 38: 449 - 465

    • ...The observation that people work harder to keep what they already hold—that they are loss averse—underpins prospect theory (57), ...

  • Reinforcement Learning and Episodic Memory in Humans and Animals: An Integrative Framework

    Samuel J. Gershman ¹ and Nathaniel D. Daw ^{2 1}Department of Psychology and Center for Brain Science, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; email: [email protected] ²Princeton Neuroscience Institute and Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 68: 101 - 128

    • ...They demonstrated that the descriptive parameterization of these quantities in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) can be empirically derived from their ecological distribution (a proxy for their availability in memory)....
    • ...This analysis reproduces the curvature of the utility function proposed by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) on purely descriptive grounds to explain risk aversion; analogous considerations about the relative distribution of debits explain loss aversion....
    • ...the classic description-based experiments of Kahneman & Tversky (1979) demonstrated apparent overweighting of rare events, ...

  • Decision Analysis for Management of Natural Hazards

    Michael Simpson, ¹ Rachel James, ¹ Jim W. Hall, ¹ Edoardo Borgomeo, ¹ Matthew C. Ives, ¹ Susana Almeida, ² Ashley Kingsborough, ¹ Theo Economou, ³ David Stephenson, ³ and Thorsten Wagener ^{2,4 1}Environmental Change Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3QY, United Kingdom; email: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] ²Department of Civil Engineering, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1TR, United Kingdom; email: [email protected], [email protected] ³Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Exeter, Exeter EX4 4QF, United Kingdom; email: [email protected], [email protected] ⁴Cabot Institute, Royal Fort House, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1UJ, United Kingdom

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 41: 489 - 516

    • ...Kahneman & Tversky's (5) prospect theory has been widely applied to understand decision making under uncertainty and appears to resonate well with actual behavior (6)...
    • ...and intuitive preferences between sets of options may not be consistent under alternative framings of the decision in question (5)....

  • Bunching

    Henrik Jacobsen KlevenDepartment of Economics, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 8: 435 - 464

    • ...The most influential theory of reference dependence is prospect theory by Kahneman & Tversky (1979), ...

  • The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Benefits: New Evidence and Interpretation

    Johannes F. Schmieder ¹ and Till von Wachter ^{2 1}Department of Economics, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 02215; email: [email protected]du²Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90095; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 8: 547 - 581

    • ... allow for reference dependence in the utility function, similar to Kahneman & Tversky's (1979) prospect theory....

  • Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes

    Isabela Mares and Lauren YoungDepartment of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 19: 267 - 288

    • ...Being in the domain of gains (positive inducements) rather than losses (negative inducements) has implications for how individuals think about risk and how much utility they derive from various options (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), ...

  • The Nonconscious at Work

    Michael G. Pratt and Eliana CrosinaCarroll School of Management, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02467; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 3: 321 - 347

    • ...; Kahneman & Tversky 1979, 1984) was also bringing attention to the nonconscious, ...

  • The Social Context of Decisions

    Richard P. LarrickFuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 3: 441 - 467

    • ...Tversky and Kahneman (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1991) argued that a few universal cognitive tendencies similarly guide risky choice, ...

  • Making Healthy Choices Easier: Regulation versus Nudging

    Pelle Guldborg Hansen, ^1,2 Laurits Rohden Skov, ³ and Katrine Lund Skov ^{4 1}Communication, Business and Information Technology,²Center for Science, Society and Policy, Roskilde University, 4000 Roskilde, Denmark; email: [email protected] ³Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg University, 9100 Aalborg, Denmark; email: [email protected] ⁴Danish Nudging Network, 1208 København K, Denmark; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Public Health Vol. 37: 237 - 251

    • ...which is rooted in dual-process theories of cognition and information processing (32, 54...

  • Contributions to Defined Contribution Pension Plans

    James J. Choi ^{1,2 1}School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8200; email: [email protected] ²National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

    Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 7: 161 - 178

    • ...loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) may keep people at the status quo....

  • Behavioral Finance

    David HirshleiferMerage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, California 92697; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 7: 133 - 159

    • ...Termed loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), this phenomenon has been modeled as a distaste for gambles whose payoffs sometimes fall slightly short of a reference point....
    • ...5.6.2. Prospect theory.Reference dependence and loss aversion are ingredients in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1992), ...

  • Dynamics, Viability, and Resilience in Bioeconomics

    Jean-Paul ChavasDepartment of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 7: 209 - 231

    • ...There is evidence that the expected utility model can fail to provide an accurate representation of behavior under risk (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....
    • ...There is evidence that individuals tend to overreact to rare events (defined as events occurring with low probability) (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • Understanding Behavioral Explanations of the WTP-WTA Divergence Through a Neoclassical Lens: Implications for Environmental Policy

    Younjun Kim, ¹ Catherine L. Kling, ² and Jinhua Zhao ^{3 1}College of Business Administration, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588; email: [email protected] ²Center for Agricultural and Rural Development and Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011; email: [email protected] ³Department of Economics and Department of Agricultural, Food and Resource Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 7: 169 - 187

    • ...Two central tenets of prospect theory are that preference may depend on a certain reference point with higher marginal utility for losses than for gains relative to the reference point (Kahneman & Tversky 1979).¹¹ Reference dependence and loss aversion are considered by many as offering the most compelling explanation for the WTP-WTA disparity....

  • Experiments in International Relations: Lab, Survey, and Field

    Susan D. HydeDepartment of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 18: 403 - 424

    • ...One of the clearest areas in which IR theory has already been strongly influenced by experimental findings from the lab is prospect theory (Boettcher 1995, 2004; Kahneman & Tversky 1979...

  • Emotion and Decision Making

    Jennifer S. Lerner, ¹ Ye Li, ² Piercarlo Valdesolo, ³ and Karim S. Kassam ^{4 1}Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; email: [email protected] ²School of Business Administration, University of California, Riverside, California 92521; email: [email protected] ³Department of Psychology, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, California 91711; email: [email protected] ⁴Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 66: 799 - 823

    • ...Even psychologists' critiques of expected utility theory focused primarily on understanding cognitive processes (see Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • The Evolutionary Roots of Human Decision Making

    Laurie R. Santos and Alexandra G. RosatiDepartment of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06511; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 66: 321 - 347

    • ...capuchins exhibited qualitatively similar framing effects as human tested in similar framing studies (Kahneman 2011, Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1981)....

  • Information Processing as a Paradigm for Decision Making

    Daniel M. Oppenheimer and Evan KelsoAnderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90077; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 66: 277 - 294

    • ...Kahneman & Tversky (1979) noted that logically identical decisions led to different behaviors when they were described as losses rather than as gains....
    • ...Kahneman & Tversky's (1979) prospect theory posited different utility functions for losses than gains....

  • Consumer Acceptance of New Food Technologies: Causes and Roots of Controversies

    Jayson L. Lusk, ¹ Jutta Roosen, ² and Andrea Bieberstein ^{2 1}Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma 74078²TUM School of Management, Technische Universität München, 85350 Freising-Weihenstephan, Germany; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 6: 381 - 405

    • ...to the misperception of the objective probability of occurrence of different outcomes. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) formalize these ideas in their development of prospect theory....
    • ...prospect theory posits that people multiply a subjective probability by a value function. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) argue, ...

  • Applying Insights from Behavioral Economics to Policy Design

    Brigitte C. Madrian ^{1,2 1}Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; email: [email protected] ²National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 6: 663 - 688

    • ...posits that individuals are twice as sensitive to losses as they are to gains of an equal magnitude and that gains and losses are evaluated relative to an endogenously chosen reference point (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....
    • ...lottery-like incentives such as the one discussed above may actually be more motivating than linear financial rewards because individuals tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight larger probabilities in their decision making (this is referred to as probability weighting in the prospect theory model of Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • The Endowment Effect

    Keith M. Marzilli Ericson ^{1 , 3} and Andreas Fuster ^{2 1}School of Management, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 02115; email: [email protected] ²Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY 10045³National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 6: 555 - 579

    • ...Endowment effect experiments are used as evidence for theories of reference-dependent preferences, such as Kahneman & Tversky's (1979) prospect theory, ...
    • ...Loss aversion is one of the key elements of Kahneman & Tversky's (1979) prospect theory and subsequent derivations.⁶ To interpret the literature, ...

  • Neural Coding of Uncertainty and Probability

    Wei Ji Ma ¹ and Mehrdad Jazayeri ^{2 1}Center for Neural Science and Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, New York 10003; email: [email protected] ²McGovern Institute for Brain Research and Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Neuroscience Vol. 37: 205 - 220

    • ...for example in order to account for risk aversion (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Glimcher et al. 2008)....

  • Employee Voice and Silence

    Elizabeth W. MorrisonDepartment of Management and Organizations, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, NY 10012; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 1: 173 - 197

    • ...engage in voice) when faced with a situation framed in terms of losses to be avoided (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • The Psychology of Entrepreneurship

    Michael Frese ^1,2 and Michael M. Gielnik ^{1 1}Department of Management & Organisations, National University of Singapore Business School, Singapore 119245; email: [email protected] ²Department of Corporate Development, Leuphana University of Lueneburg, 21335 Lueneburg, Germany

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 1: 413 - 438

    • ...prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) suggests that cognitive biases may lead to flawed decisions and suboptimal performance....

  • (Un)Ethical Behavior in Organizations

    Linda Klebe Treviño, ¹ Niki A. den Nieuwenboer, ^2, and Jennifer J. Kish-Gephart ^{3, 1}Smeal College of Business, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802; email: [email protected] ²Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, California 95053; email: [email protected] ³Sam M. Walton College of Business, University of Arkansas-Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 65: 635 - 660

    • ...A number of studies have explored framing issues similar to those in Kahneman & Tversky's (1979) prospect theory....

  • Measuring Inflation Expectations

    Olivier Armantier, ¹ Wändi Bruine de Bruin, ^2,3 Simon Potter, ¹ Giorgio Topa, ¹ Wilbert van der Klaauw, ¹ and Basit Zafar ^{1 1}Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY 10045; email: [email protected] ²Centre for Decision Research, Leeds University Business School, Leeds LS2 9JT, United Kingdom³Department of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 5: 273 - 301

    • ...and already a focus of consumers' concern (Brachinger 2008, Christandl et al. 2011, Jungermann et al. 2007, Greitemeyer et al. 2005, Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Ranyard et al. 2008)....

  • Retrospective Voting Reconsidered

    Andrew Healy ¹ and Neil Malhotra ^{2 1}Department of Economics, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, California; email: [email protected] ²Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 16: 285 - 306

    • ...Such reasoning can also help explain the power of the status quo because it may be a powerful reference point for voters to consider (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • The Behavioral Economics of Health and Health Care

    Thomas RiceDepartment of Health Policy and Management, Fielding School of Public Health, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90095-1772; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Public Health Vol. 34: 431 - 447

    • ...Nobel Prize (in economics) winner Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (26), ...
    • ...offered an alternative to the conventional theory of individual economic risk-taking behavior (26).¹ ...
    • ...so avoiding losses is one of their main decision-making goals (26)....

  • Payments for Environmental Services: Evolution Toward Efficient and Fair Incentives for Multifunctional Landscapes

    Meine van Noordwijk, ¹ Beria Leimona, ¹ Rohit Jindal, ² Grace B. Villamor, ^1,3 Mamta Vardhan, ⁴ Sara Namirembe, ⁵ Delia Catacutan, ⁶ John Kerr, ⁷ Peter A. Minang, ⁵ and Thomas P. Tomich ^{8 1}World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), Bogor 16880, Indonesia; email: [email protected], [email protected] ²Department of Resource Economics and Environmental Sociology, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2H1; email: [email protected] ³Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn, Germany 53113; email: [email protected] ⁴Institute for Sustainable Energy, Environment and Economy, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4; email: [email protected] ⁵World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), Nairobi 00100, Kenya; email: [email protected], [email protected] ⁶World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), Hanoi, Vietnam; email: [email protected] ⁷Department of Community, Agriculture, Recreation and Resource Studies, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824; email: [email protected] ⁸Agricultural Sustainability Institute, University of California, Davis, California 95616-8523; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 37: 389 - 420

    • ...as a system 1 feature that modifies the system 2 utility concept (173)....
    • ...we must take into account that landowners may fail to find the optimal adoption of their land use in the presence of complicated spatial evaluation rules (172, 173, 174, 175)....

  • A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics

    Dimitrios Bisias, ¹ Mark Flood, ⁴ Andrew W. Lo, ^{2 , 3 , 5 , 6} and Stavros Valavanis ^{3 1}Operations Research Center, ²Sloan School of Management, ³Laboratory for Financial Engineering, ⁵Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139; email: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] ⁴Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC 20220; email: [email protected] ⁶AlphaSimplex Group, LLC, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142

    Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 4: 255 - 296

    • ...Hardwired behavioral responses to double down and become more risk tolerant when faced with sure losses only make matters worse in these situations. [See Kahneman & Tversky (1979) for the loss aversion phenomenon, ...

  • Probability and Risk: Foundations and Economic Implications of Probability-Dependent Risk Preferences

    Helga Fehr-Duda ¹ and Thomas Epper ^{1 , 2 1}Institute for Environmental Decisions, ETH Zürich, 8092 Zürich, Switzerland; email: [email protected] ²Department of Economics, University of Zürich, 8006 Zürich, Switzerland; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 4: 567 - 593

    • ...as well as small and large (Hagen 1979; Kahneman & Tversky 1979...
    • ...in contrast to the original version of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), ...
    • ...the presumption that "losses loom larger than gains" (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, ...
    • ... u(−x ₂)−u(−x ₁) > μ(x ₁) − u(x ₂) for x ₁ > x ₂ ≥ 0 (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, ...

  • A Reduced-Form Approach to Behavioral Public Finance

    Sendhil Mullainathan, ¹ Joshua Schwartzstein, ² and William J. Congdon ^{3 1}Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Washington, DC 20552; email: [email protected] ²Department of Economics, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755; email: [email protected] ³Brookings Institution, Washington, DC 2003 6; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 4: 511 - 540

    • ...loss aversion may alter how individuals experience benefits: Benefits will vary depending on whether they are perceived as a loss or gain relative to some reference point (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • Toward a Comparative Sociology of Valuation and Evaluation

    Michèle LamontDepartment of Sociology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 38: 201 - 221

    • ... and behavioral economists (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) who are writing on evaluation, ...

  • A Conversation with Arnold Harberger

    Arnold C. Harberger ¹ and Richard Just ^{2 1}Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90095; email: [email protected] ²Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742; email: [email protected]

    

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 4: 1 - 26

  • Behavioral Economics and Environmental Policy

    Fredrik Carlsson and Olof Johansson-Stenman*Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, SE 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 4: 75 - 99

    • ...which means that losses (reflected by WTA) tend to loom larger than gains (reflected by WTP) also for marginal changes; see, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky (1979)...

  • Neural Basis of Reinforcement Learning and Decision Making

    Daeyeol Lee, ^1,2 Hyojung Seo, ¹ and Min Whan Jung ^{3 1}Department of Neurobiology, Kavli Institute for Neuroscience, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, Connecticut 06510; email: [email protected], [email protected] ²Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520³Neuroscience Laboratory, Institute for Medical Sciences, Ajou University School of Medicine, Suwon 443-721, Republic of Korea; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Neuroscience Vol. 35: 287 - 308

    • ...prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) can successfully account for the failures of expected utility theory in describing human decision making under uncertainty....
    • ...uncertainty about outcomes is referred to as risk (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)...

  • Equilibrium in the Initial Public Offerings Market

    Jay R. RitterWarrington College of Business Administration, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 3: 347 - 374

    • ... present an alternative explanation of the partial adjustment phenomenon using Kahneman & Tversky's (1979) prospect theory....

  • Elaborating the Individual Difference Component in Deterrence Theory

    Alex R. Piquero, ¹ Raymond Paternoster, ² Greg Pogarsky, ³ and Thomas Loughran ^{2 1}Program in Criminology, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080; email: [email protected] ²Department of Criminology, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742; email: [email protected], [email protected] ³School of Criminal Justice, SUNY, Albany, New York 12222; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Law and Social Science Vol. 7: 335 - 360

    • ...This is based on ideas taken from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), ...

  • Behavior, Robustness, and Sufficient Statistics in Welfare Measurement

    Richard E. JustDepartment of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 3: 37 - 70

    • ... as well as more sophisticated behavioral departures from profit maximization under risk aversion (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....
    • ...the pathbreaking work of Kahneman & Tversky (1979) and others has documented a number of behavioral patterns that are anomalous in the context of the standard utility maximization model....

  • Neurobiology of Economic Choice: A Good-Based Model

    Camillo Padoa-SchioppaDepartment of Anatomy and Neurobiology, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri 63110; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Neuroscience Vol. 34: 333 - 359

    • ... compared the encoding of subjective value when individuals gain or lose money—an important distinction because behavioral measures of value are typically reference-dependent (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • The Contribution of Behavioral Economics to Political Science

    Rick K. WilsonDepartment of Political Science, Rice University, Houston, Texas 77251-1892; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 14: 201 - 223

    • ...Kahneman & Tversky (1979) opened up the discussion in economics when questioning whether standard forms of expected utility held up....

  • Portfolio Theory: As I Still See It

    Harry M. MarkowitzHarry Markowitz Company, San Diego, California 92109; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 2: 1 - 23

    • ... is similar to the value function in Kahneman & Tversky (1979) in that it has an inflection point at or near current wealth, ...
    • ...the prospect theory of Kahneman & Tversky (1979) measures utility (which they refer to as the "value") as a function of the deviation from current wealth, ...
    • ...The two main differences between Kahneman & Tversky (1979) and Markowitz (1952b)...
    • ... are as follows: (a) The Kahneman & Tversky (1979) utility function is convex to the left of the origin and concave to the right, ...
    • ... maximizes expected utility,using probabilities p ₁ … , p_n , whereas Kahneman & Tversky (1979) use weightsto maximize...
    • ...convex to the right—versus the Kahneman & Tversky (1979) hypothesis—convex to the left, ...
    • ...A probability distribution P is said to PT-dominate a distribution Q if P would be preferred to Q by all agents with the prospect theory value function of Kahneman & Tversky (1979)....
    • ...The PT combination of weights and values are in response to a series of choices among gambles reported by Kahneman & Tversky (1979)....
    • ...All the observations of Kahneman & Tversky (1979) are explained given the following:...
    • ...There is much evidence to support the notion that human decision-making is not consistent with expected-utility maximization; this is most famously shown in Allais (1953) as well as Kahneman & Tversky (1979)....
    • ...Kahneman & Tversky (1979) modified their choice of weights to avoid a problem with stochastic dominance....

  • Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing Tests

    Ravi Jagannathan, ¹ Ernst Schaumburg, ² and Guofu Zhou ^{3 1}Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208; NBER, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; email: [email protected] ²Federal Reserve Bank, New York, New York 10045³Olin School of Business, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri 63130; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 2: 49 - 74

    • ...among others, building on the seminal work of Kahneman & Tversky (1979)....

  • Resistance to Legality

    Richard A. Brisbin, Jr.Department of Political Science, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia 26506-6317; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Law and Social Science Vol. 6: 25 - 44

    • ...In this respect the prediction of the value of resistance exhibits the bounded rationality depicted in studies of policy and economic choices (Jones 2001, Kahneman 2003, Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1973)....

  • Climate Risk

    Nathan E. Hultman, ¹ David M. Hassenzahl, ² and Steve Rayner ^{3 1}School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742; email: [email protected] ²School of Sustainability and the Environment, Chatham University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15232; email: [email protected] ³Institute for Science, Innovation and Society, Saïd Business School, and James Martin 21st Century School, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 1HP, United Kingdom; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 35: 283 - 303

    • ...Later work of Kahneman & Tversky (69) acknowledged that heuristics and biases may be more than errors of rationality....

  • Providing Safe Water: Evidence from Randomized Evaluations

    Amrita Ahuja, ¹ Michael Kremer, ^{2 , 3 , 4} and Alix Peterson Zwane ^{5 1}Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138²Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138³NBER, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138⁴Brookings Institution, Washington, DC 20036⁵Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Seattle, Washington 98102; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 2: 237 - 256

    • ...Prospect theory predicts that loss aversion will cause the loss-framed message to have a bigger effect on people's choices and behavior (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1981)....

  • Empirical Challenges for Risk Preferences and Production

    David R. Just, ¹ Sivalai V. Khantachavana, ¹ and Richard E. Just ^{2 1}Department of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853; email: [email protected] ²Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 2: 13 - 31

    • ...Later, Samuelson (1963), Lichtenstein & Slovic (1971), Kahneman & Tversky (1979), and Loomes (1991)...

  • How (Not) to Do Decision Theory

    Eddie Dekel ¹ and Barton L. Lipman ^{2 1}Economics Department, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208, and School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 69978 Israel; email: [email protected] ²Department of Economics, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 02215; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 2: 257 - 282

    • ...the experimental and theoretical work of Kahneman & Tversky (1979) and many others in psychology who pushed for an even more fundamental reconsideration of how people make economic decisions....

  • Questions in Decision Theory

    Itzhak GilboaEitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel, and HEC, Paris 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 2: 1 - 19

    • ...The most famous attack on expected utility theory, namely prospect theory, proposed by Kahneman & Tversky (1979), ...

  • Life-Cycle Finance and the Design of Pension Plans

    Zvi Bodie, ^* Jérôme Detemple, and Marcel RindisbacherSchool of Management, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 02215; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 1: 249 - 286

    • ...Behavioral aspects such as loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky 1979), narrow framing, ...

  • What Decision Neuroscience Teaches Us About Financial Decision Making

    Peter BossaertsDivision of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125; Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 1: 383 - 404

    • ...Indeed, prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) can be viewed as an attempt to characterize actual human choice (and recently also nonhuman primate choice; Chen et al. 2006)...
    • ...one could always resort to "thought experiments," by asking subjects for hypothetical choice in imagined situations (as in the original experiments in Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • Consumer Finance

    Peter TufanoHarvard Business School, National Bureau of Economic Research, and Doorways to Dreams Fund, Inc. Boston, Massachusetts 02163; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 1: 227 - 247

    • ...One of the earliest and most critical contributions to behavioral economics is Kahneman & Tversky's (1979)...

  • Energy Efficiency Economics and Policy

    Kenneth Gillingham, ¹ Richard G. Newell, ^{2 , 3 , 4 , *} and Karen Palmer ^{3 1}Precourt Energy Efficiency Center, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94309; email: [email protected] ²Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708; email: [email protected] ³Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C. 20036; email: [email protected] ⁴National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 1: 597 - 620

    • ...beginning with the research by Tversky & Kahneman indicating that both sophisticated and naïve respondents will consistently violate axioms of rational choice in certain situations (e.g., see Tversky & Kahneman 1974, Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....
    • ...so that the welfare change is much greater from a loss than from an expected gain of the same magnitude (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • Quality-Based Financial Incentives in Health Care: Can We Improve Quality by Paying for It?

    Douglas A. Conrad ¹ and Lisa Perry ^{2 1}Department of Health Services, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195; email: [email protected] ²Department of Economics, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Public Health Vol. 30: 357 - 371

    • ...drawn largely from microeconomic theory (3, 4, 17, 31), with important contributions from behavioral economics (49, 76, 77), ...
    • ...owing to "loss aversion," penalties will elicit a stronger response than would rewards of equal magnitude (49, 76, 77)....
    • ...Incentives of longer duration will also crowd out intrinsic motivation to a lesser extent than short-term incentives (49)....

  • Neuroeconomics

    George Loewenstein, ¹ Scott Rick, ² and Jonathan D. Cohen ^{3 1}Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213,²Department of Operations and Information Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104,³Department of Psychology, Center for the Study of Brain, Mind and Behavior, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08540, and Department of Psychiatry, Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260; email: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 59: 647 - 672

    • ...as originally noted by Markowitz (1952) and developed more fully by Kahneman & Tversky (1979), ...
    • ...behavioral modifications to EU have assumed instead that people overweight small probabilities and underweight large ones (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) or that they tend to place disproportionate attention on the worst and best outcomes that could occur (e.g., ...
    • ...which assumes that decisions are based on the likelihood and desirability of final outcomes. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) account for this "reflection effect" by proposing that the marginal value of both gains and losses generally decreases with their magnitude....
    • ...and focus on the components that distinguish them" (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • Models of Decision Making and Residential Energy Use

    Charlie Wilson and Hadi DowlatabadiInstitute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 32: 169 - 203

    • ...There are two key implications for the microeconomic decision model: (a) utility is dependent on a reference point; and (b) utility is carried by gains and losses relative to this reference point, not final outcomes (44)....

  • IMAGING VALUATION MODELS IN HUMAN CHOICE

    P. Read Montague, ^1,2 Brooks King-Casas, ¹ and Jonathan D. Cohen ^{3 1}Department of Neuroscience, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas 77030²Menninger Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas 77030³Department of Psychology, Center for the Study of Brain, Mind, and Behavior, Green Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544

    Annual Review of Neuroscience Vol. 29: 417 - 448

  • PROSPECT THEORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

    Jonathan MercerDepartment of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195-3530; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 8: 1 - 21

    • ...people feel differently about a policy guaranteed to ensure a 90% employment rate than they feel about a policy guaranteed to provide a 10% unemployment rate. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) found that framing a policy as a loss (10% unemployment) will put someone in a domain of loss, ...
    • ...Of the 2000 most recent citations to Kahneman & Tversky's 1979 article, ...
    • ...Psychologists create experiments that permit them to isolate variables of interest. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) created experiments in which it "is reasonable to assume either that the original formulation of the prospects leaves no room for further editing, ...

  • New Risks for Workers: Pensions, Labor Markets, and Gender

    Kim M. Shuey ¹ andAngela M. O'Rand ^{2 1}Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27516-2524; email: [email protected] ²Department of Sociology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 30: 453 - 477

    • ...Literature in the psychology of saving relies less on the life cycle of the household and the maintenance of consumption over the life course and focuses more on behavioral patterns derived from life experiences (Barsky et al. 1997; Bernheim 1991; Kahneman & Tversky 1979...

  • Operant Conditioning

    J. E. R. Staddon and D. T. CeruttiDepartment of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708-0086; e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 54: 115 - 144

  • EXPERIMENTAL METHODS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

    Rose McDermottDepartment of Government, McGraw Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14850; e-mail: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 5: 31 - 61

    • ...In attempting to develop a descriptively accurate model of choice as an alternative to expected utility models, Kahneman & Tversky (1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1992) delineated prospect theory....

  • Rationality

    Eldar Shafir and Robyn A. LeBoeufDepartment of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544; e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 53: 491 - 517

    • ...the most influential of which has been prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1992)....
    • ...Prospect theory posits that probabilities have nonlinear impacts on decisions (Gonzalez & Wu 1999, Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Prelec 2000, Tversky & Wakker 1995) and proposes an S-shaped value function with three important properties....

  • Psychology and International Relations Theory

    J. M. Goldgeier¹ and P. E. Tetlock^{2 1}Department of Political Science, George Washington University, 2201 G. Street NW, Washington, DC 20052; e-mail: [email protected];²Departments of Psychology and Political Science, Ohio State University, 142 Townshend Hall, 1885 Neil Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43210; e-mail: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 4: 67 - 92

    • ...we argue that neoliberal institutionalist and constructivist theories could draw much more effectively than they do from work on bounded rationality in competitive markets and mixed-motive games (Simon 1957, 1982, Kahneman & Tversky 1979, 1984)....

  • Problems for Judgment and Decision Making

    R. HastiePsychology Department, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0345; e-mail: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 52: 653 - 683

    • ...accompanied by the proposal of a labile reference point (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....
    • ...the results are reasonably consistent with power functions, but later studies, since Kahneman & Tversky (1979), ...

  • Consumer Research: In Search of Identity

    Itamar Simonson,¹ Ziv Carmon,² Ravi Dhar,³ Aimee Drolet,⁴ and Stephen M. Nowlis^{5 1}Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305-5015; e-mail: [email protected] ²INSEAD, Fountainbleau Cedex, 77305 France; e-mail: [email protected] ³School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520; e-mail: [email protected] ⁴Anderson School of Management, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California 90048; e-mail: [email protected] ⁵College of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287; e-mail: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 52: 249 - 275

    • ...the primary influence on BDT consumer research has been the BDT literature, including the work of Kahneman & Tversky (e.g. 1979), ...
    • ... and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) have had tremendous impact on the field....

  • Preference Formation

    James N. DruckmanDepartment of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455-0410; e-mail: [email protected] Arthur LupiaDepartment of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093-0521; e-mail: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 3: 1 - 24

    • ...Fueling this debate is the existence of experimental subjects whose preferences violate transitivity or invariance assumptions (e.g. Tversky 1969, Lichtenstein & Slovic 1971, Grether & Plott 1979, Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1987, Quattrone & Tversky 1988, Tversky & Thaler 1990, Rabin 1998)....

  • BOUNDED RATIONALITY

    Bryan D. JonesDepartment of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195; e-mail: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 2: 297 - 321

    • ...essentially being more risk-adverse for gains than for losses (Kahneman & Tversky 1983, 1985)....
    • ...they do not update their choices in light of incoming information about the probability of outcomes in the manner predicted by calculations from probability theory (Bayes' rule is the relevant yardstick) (Edwards 1968;, Kahneman & Tversky 1983, 1985;, Piattelli-Palmarini 1994)....

  • Breakdown Theories of Collective Action

    Bert UseemDepartment of Sociology, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 24: 215 - 238

    • ... have recently advanced a version of the breakdown model that incorporates two other sets of theoretical insights into the model: prospect theory, as developed by Kahneman & Tversky (1979), ...

  • THE CAUSES OF WAR AND THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE

    Jack S. LevyDepartment of Political Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08901-1568; e-mail: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 1: 139 - 165

    • ...which is one of the most recent attempts to apply a social-psychological model to international relations but which shares some elements of more formal rational choice models. Kahneman & Tversky (1979) developed this theory of individual choice under conditions of risk to explain experimental anomalies in expected utility theory....

  • JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING

    B. A. Mellers¹, A. Schwartz², and A. D. J. Cooke^{3 1}Department of Psychology, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210, e-mail: [email protected] ;²Department of Medical Education, University of Illinois, Chicago, Illinois 60612-7309; ³Marketing Department, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 49: 447 - 477

    • ...an asymmetry well known in choice behavior (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....
    • ...a result known as the reflection effect (Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • Innovations in Experimental Design in Attitude Surveys

    Paul M. SnidermanDepartment of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305 Douglas B. GrobDepartment of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 22: 377 - 399

    • ...usually of undergraduates (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky 1979, 1984;, Quattrone & Tversky 1988)....

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  • Decision-Making Processes in Social Contexts

    Elizabeth Bruch ¹ and Fred Feinberg ^{2 1}Department of Sociology and Complex Systems, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104; email: [email protected] ²Ross School of Business and Department of Statistics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 43: 207 - 227

    • ...preferences are constructed in the moment of elicitation (Bettman et al. 1998, Lichtenstein & Slovic 2006)....
    • ...Several theories have been put forward to explain this effect (see Lichtenstein & Slovic 2006, ...

  • Integrating Ecology and Economics in the Study of Ecosystem Services: Some Lessons Learned

    Stephen PolaskyDepartment of Applied Economics and Department of Ecology, Evolution, and Behavior, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota 55108; email: [email protected] Kathleen Segerson*Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut 06269; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 1: 409 - 434

    • ...An alternative view within parts of psychology and decision science is that preferences are constructed through a cognitive process, particularly for complex and unfamiliar goods (Lichtenstein & Slovic 2006)....

  • Mindful Judgment and Decision Making

    Elke U. Weber and Eric J. JohnsonCenter for the Decision Sciences (CDS), Columbia University, New York, New York 10027; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 60: 53 - 85

    • ...The recognition that preferences are typically constructed rather than stored and retrieved (Lichtenstein & Slovic 2006) may be psychology's most successful export to behavioral economics and the policy community and illustrates the utility of psychological process explanations....
    • ...from preference reversal studies of risky decisions in the 1970s to the theory of task-contingent weighting of multiattribute choice (see Lichtenstein & Slovic 2006)....

  • Models of Decision Making and Residential Energy Use

    Charlie Wilson and Hadi DowlatabadiInstitute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 32: 169 - 203

    • ...Preferences based on an individual's values are often constructed as they are being elicited (193)....

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  • The Social Context of Decisions

    Richard P. LarrickFuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 3: 441 - 467

    • ...The second estimate doubles the sample size and yields the largest reduction in error of any increase in sample size; additional estimates continue to reduce error but at a diminishing rate (Hogarth 1978, Mannes et al. 2014)....
    • ...There are limitations on the wisdom of crowds (Mannes et al. 2014): If everyone shares a bias (e.g., ...
    • ...Reliance on one judge completely misses the benefits of error reduction in a large sample. Mannes et al. (2014) demonstrated that an effective strategy for capturing both expertise and error reduction is to attempt to identify five to ten experts, ...
    • ...people misunderstand the benefits of the so-called wisdom of crowds; they incorrectly believe that averaging independent judgments will be no more accurate than the average member in a social group (Larrick & Soll 2006, Mannes et al. 2014)....

  • Evidence-Based Practice: The Psychology of EBP Implementation

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  • Climate Risk Management

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  • Meanings and Functions of Money in Different Cultural Milieus

    Dov Cohen, Faith Shin, and Xi LiuDepartment of Psychology, University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois 61820, USA; email: [email protected]

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  • Geologic Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste: Status, Key Issues, and Trends

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    • ...Ongoing longitudinal studies in the United States and Sweden that have added measures of decision-making competence suggest that decision-making competence may be relatively stable across adulthood until late in life (Boyle et al. 2012, Del Missier et al. 2020, Parker et al. 2018)....

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  • Decision Making Across Adulthood

    JoNell Strough ¹ and Wändi Bruine de Bruin ^{2 1}Department of Psychology, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia 26506, USA; email: [email protected] ²Sol Price School of Public Policy, Dornsife Department of Psychology, Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics, and Center for Economic and Social Research, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-0626, USA

    Annual Review of Developmental Psychology Vol. 2: 345 - 363

    • ...Normative theories specify four processes fundamental for making rational choices (Edwards 1954, Parker & Fischhoff 2005, Raiffa 1968)....
    • ...Researchers have adapted behavioral decision-making tasks to create measures of decision-making competence that test the accuracy and consistency of these decision-making processes; performance on these measures has been linked to avoiding undesirable real-world outcomes (Bruine de Bruin et al. 2007, Finucane et al. 2002, Parker & Fischhoff 2005)....
    • ...See Parker & Fischhoff (2005) and Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007)...
    • ... finding mixed age differences in a validated measure of adult decision-making competence (A-DMC) that built upon a similar measure for adolescents (Parker & Fischhoff 2005)....

  • Consequences of Age-Related Cognitive Declines

    Timothy SalthouseDepartment of Psychology, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia 22904-4400; email: [email protected]

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    • ...decision-making competence or rationality (De Bruin et al. 2007, Parker & Fischoff 2005, Stanovich 2009, Stanovich & West 2008), ...

  • Mindful Judgment and Decision Making

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    • ...Decision-making competency.Fischhoff and colleagues have attempted to capture a common skill component in the judgments and choices made by adolescents (Parker & Fischhoff 2005)...

  • Cognition in Organizations

    Gerard P. Hodgkinson and Mark P. HealeyLeeds University Business School, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, United Kingdom; email: [email protected], [email protected]

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    • ...cognitive style has been shown to influence decision-making performance (Levin et al. 2000, Parker & Fischhoff 2005), ...

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    • ...they will learn better than if given a different modality (Pashler et al. 2008)....
    • ...Pashler et al. (2008) conducted an extensive review of the learning styles research applying strict screening criteria to the inclusion of studies....

  • Learner Control and e-Learning: Taking Stock and Moving Forward

    Kenneth G. Brown, ¹ Garett Howardson, ^2, and Sandra L. Fisher ^{3 1}Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242; email: [email protected] ²Department of Psychology, Hofstra University, Hempstead, New York 11549; email: [email protected] ³School of Business, Clarkson University, Potsdam, New York 13699

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    • ...Pashler et al. (2008) concluded that although learners are generally able to state learning preferences that are somewhat stable, ...
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    JoNell Strough ¹ and Wändi Bruine de Bruin ^{2 1}Department of Psychology, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia 26506, USA; email: [email protected] ²Sol Price School of Public Policy, Dornsife Department of Psychology, Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics, and Center for Economic and Social Research, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-0626, USA

    Annual Review of Developmental Psychology Vol. 2: 345 - 363

    • ...Satisficing may be preferred over maximizing when time is limited and effort is costly (Payne et al. 1993)....
    • ... includes six tasks from the literature on judgment and decision making that assess people's ability to implement decision processes (see Table 1): Applying Decision Rules assesses the accurate application of rules to hypothetical choices about consumer products and health treatments (Payne et al. 1993)....

  • Experiments on Cognition, Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Relationships

    Vincent P. Crawford ^{1,2,3 1}Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3UQ, United Kingdom; email: [email protected] ²All Souls College, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 4AL, United Kingdom³Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, California 92093-0508, USA

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 11: 167 - 191

    • ...adapting Payne et al.'s (1993) MouseLab methods for studying individual decisions....

  • Decision-Making Processes in Social Contexts

    Elizabeth Bruch ¹ and Fred Feinberg ^{2 1}Department of Sociology and Complex Systems, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104; email: [email protected] ²Ross School of Business and Department of Statistics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 43: 207 - 227

    • ...limited working memory, and limited computational capabilities (Miller 1956, Payne et al. 1993)....
    • ...as reflected by the relative importance or beta coefficients (Payne et al. 1993, ...

  • Measuring and Modeling Attention

    Andrew CaplinDepartment of Economics, New York University, New York, NY 10003; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 8: 379 - 403

    • ...These have been labeled alternative-based and attribute-based search, respectively, by Payne et al. (1993)....

  • Emotion and Decision Making

    Jennifer S. Lerner, ¹ Ye Li, ² Piercarlo Valdesolo, ³ and Karim S. Kassam ^{4 1}Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138; email: [email protected] ²School of Business Administration, University of California, Riverside, California 92521; email: [email protected] ³Department of Psychology, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, California 91711; email: [email protected] ⁴Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 66: 799 - 823

    • ...The first departure from the strictest rational choice models is to allow for constructed rather than stable preferences (Payne et al. 1993, Slovic 1995), ...

  • Heuristic Decision Making

    Gerd Gigerenzer and Wolfgang GaissmaierCenter for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, 14195 Berlin, Germany; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 62: 451 - 482

    • ...and equal-weight rules. Payne and colleagues (1993) provided evidence for the adaptive use of these and other heuristics in their seminal research....
    • ...but at the cost of accuracy (Payne et al. 1993, Shah & Oppenheimer 2008)....
    • ...The program on the adaptive decision maker (Payne et al. 1993) is built on the assumption that heuristics achieve a beneficial trade-off between accuracy and effort....
    • ...Similarly, research on the adaptive decision maker (Payne et al. 1993)...

  • Conceptual Consumption

    Dan Ariely ¹ and Michael I. Norton ^{2 1}Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708; email: [email protected] ²Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts 02163; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 60: 475 - 499

    • ...Abundant evidence demonstrates that people's preferences are frequently constructed in the moment and are susceptible to fleeting situational factors (Bettman et al. 1998, Payne et al. 1993, Shafir et al. 1993, Slovic 1995), ...

  • Models of Decision Making and Residential Energy Use

    Charlie Wilson and Hadi DowlatabadiInstitute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 32: 169 - 203

    • ...choose the alternative that was chosen last time). "Elimination heuristics" narrow down the range of alternatives by immediately rejecting those with the worst score on a particular attribute (e.g., ignore the two most expensive alternatives) (54, 55)....
    • ...Heuristics allow cognitive effort to be matched to the particular structure of a decision (55)....

  • Supporting Informed Consumer Health Care Decisions: Data Presentation Approaches that Facilitate the Use of Information in Choice

    Judith H. HibbardDepartment of Planning, Public Policy and Management, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 97403; email: [email protected] Ellen PetersDecision Research, 1201 Oak Street, Eugene, Oregon 97401-3575; Department of Psychology, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon 97401; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Public Health Vol. 24: 413 - 433

    • ...the integration of different types of information and different types of variables into a decision is a very difficult cognitive process (32, 45)....
    • ...However, these shortcuts can undermine the decision-maker's own self-interest (8, 32)....

  • Rationality

    Eldar Shafir and Robyn A. LeBoeufDepartment of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544; e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 53: 491 - 517

    • ...such as verbal protocols (Ericsson & Simon 1984), information-acquisition sequences (Payne et al. 1993), ...

  • Problems for Judgment and Decision Making

    R. HastiePsychology Department, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0345; e-mail: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 52: 653 - 683

    • ...The recent simulation methods have been pioneered by Axelrod (1984), Payne et al (1993), Gigerenzer et al (1999)....
    • ...Another is the sudden popularity of cognitive heuristics models for judgment (Tversky & Kahneman 1974) and choice (summarized in Payne et al 1993)....
    • ...information processing (symbolic production systems; e.g. Lovett 1998, Payne et al 1993), ...

  • Decision Technology

    W. EdwardsWise Decisions, Inc., Studio City, California, 91604; e-mail: [email protected] B. FasoloPsychology Department, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309; e-mail: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 52: 581 - 606

    • ...Such "winnowed-out winners" can occur whenever the two stages use any two of the following five decision rules (Payne et al 1993): ...
    • ...and why does a DM use them at all? The answer comes from research on information-processing models of decision making (e.g. Payne et al 1993), ...

  • Warmer and More Social: Recent Developments in Cognitive Social Psychology

    Norbert SchwarzInstitute for Social Research and Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106-1248; email: [email protected]

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    • ...and decision making (e.g. Payne et al 1993) and identify the conditions under which different strategies are likely to be employed (for reviews, ...

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    Annual Review of Developmental Psychology Vol. 2: 345 - 363

    • ...Normative theories specify four processes fundamental for making rational choices (Edwards 1954, Parker & Fischhoff 2005, Raiffa 1968)....

  • Statistical Causality from a Decision-Theoretic Perspective

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    • ...Does this argument conflict with the APA amicus brief in favor of letting juveniles make their own abortion decisions? According to Steinberg et al. (2009), ...

  • Using Developmental Science to Distinguish Adolescents and Adults Under the Law

    Laurence Steinberg ¹ and Grace Icenogle ^{2 1}Department of Psychology, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122, USA; email: [email protected] ²School of Social Ecology, University of California, Irvine, California 92697, USA; email: [email protected]

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    • ...Other studies show that the ability to make informed decisions about granting informed consent in medical or research contexts also plateaus around this same age (Steinberg et al. 2009)....
    • ...anticipation of future consequences, and future orientation throughout late adolescence (Steinberg et al. 2009, 2018)....
    • ...adolescents are more likely than adults to prefer small but immediately available rewards over large but delayed rewards (Banich et al. 2013, Olson et al. 2007, Romer et al. 2010, Steinberg et al. 2009)....
    • ...others assert that an imperfect boundary drawn with science in mind is preferable to a boundary that ignores developmental science entirely (Steinberg et al. 2009)....
    • ...whereas juvenile crime is by and large impulsive and influenced by peers (Steinberg et al. 2009), ...

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  • Reinforcement Learning and Episodic Memory in Humans and Animals: An Integrative Framework

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  • Information Processing as a Paradigm for Decision Making

    Daniel M. Oppenheimer and Evan KelsoAnderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90077; email: [email protected]

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    • ...One research program that has explicitly rejected the notion of utility is the decision by sampling (DbS) approach (Stewart et al. 2006)....

  • Mindful Judgment and Decision Making

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    • ...Other authors (Kessler 2002, Kraemer et al. 2004, Swets et al. 2000) have described methods that can be used to locate optimal thresholds along continua for the purpose of decision making....

  • Construct Validity: Advances in Theory and Methodology

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    • ...and to the greater predictive success obtained by linear models of the human judge (Dawes 1979, Dawes et al. 1989, Swets et al. 2000)....
    • ...does better in predicting future (as well as previous) instances than the judge on whom these ratings are based (see, e.g., Swets et al. 2000)....

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    • ...but I submit that many instances of applied decision analysis and aiding have had their origins in research by behavioral scientists (see Cooksey 1996, Swets et al 2000 for many examples)....

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    • ...which seeks to systematically explain when and how individuals depart from the expectations of neoclassical economic models (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1974)....

  • Judging the Judiciary by the Numbers: Empirical Research on Judges

    Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ¹ and Andrew J. Wistrich ^{2 1}Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, Ithaca, New York 14853²United States District Court, Central District of California, Los Angeles, California 90012

    Annual Review of Law and Social Science Vol. 13: 203 - 229

    • ...people commonly rely on numeric reference points as anchors (Tversky & Kahneman 1974)....

  • Household Response to Time-Varying Electricity Prices

    Matthew Harding ¹ and Steven Sexton ^{2 1}Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, California 92697; email: [email protected] ²Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 9: 337 - 359

    • ...If cognitive ability and attention are constrained (e.g., Simon 1955, Tversky & Kahneman 1974), ...

  • Toward a Rational and Mechanistic Account of Mental Effort

    Amitai Shenhav, ^1,2 Sebastian Musslick, ³ Falk Lieder, ⁴ Wouter Kool, ⁵ Thomas L. Griffiths, ⁶ Jonathan D. Cohen, ^3,7 and Matthew M. Botvinick ^{8,9 1}Department of Cognitive, Linguistic and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912; email: [email protected] ²Brown Institute for Brain Science, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912³Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544⁴Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720⁵Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138⁶Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720⁷Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08540⁸Google DeepMind, London M1C 4AG, United Kingdom⁹Gatsby Computational Neuroscience Unit, University College London, London W1T 4JG, United Kingdom

    Annual Review of Neuroscience Vol. 40: 99 - 124

    • ...People's judgments and decisions systematically violate the normative principles of logic, probability theory, and expected utility theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1974)....

  • Impact of Provider Incentives on Quality and Value of Health Care

    Tim Doran, ¹ Kristin A. Maurer, ² and Andrew M. Ryan ^{2 1}Department of Health Sciences, University of York, Heslington, York YO10 5DD, United Kingdom; email: [email protected] ²Department of Health Management and Policy, School of Public Health, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Public Health Vol. 38: 449 - 465

    • ...This hybrid of economics and psychology recognizes that people have limited cognitive resources (91) and employ mental shortcuts (heuristics) in their decision making (95)....

  • Sociolegal Approaches to the Study of Guilty Pleas and Prosecution

    Brian D. Johnson, ¹ Ryan D. King, ² and Cassia Spohn ^{3 1}Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742; email: [email protected] ²Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210; email: [email protected] ³School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85281; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Law and Social Science Vol. 12: 479 - 495

    • ...Tversky & Kahneman 1974) and can result in overconfidence in trial outcomes, ...

  • The Nonconscious at Work

    Michael G. Pratt and Eliana CrosinaCarroll School of Management, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02467; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 3: 321 - 347

    • ...During this time, research by Tversky and Kahneman (Tversky & Kahneman 1974...
    • ...anchoring bias; see Tversky & Kahneman 1974)—a prominent topic in judgment and decision research—from those based on expert schemas that arise after years of focused practice in environments that provide both relevant and quick feedback....

  • Making Healthy Choices Easier: Regulation versus Nudging

    Pelle Guldborg Hansen, ^1,2 Laurits Rohden Skov, ³ and Katrine Lund Skov ^{4 1}Communication, Business and Information Technology,²Center for Science, Society and Policy, Roskilde University, 4000 Roskilde, Denmark; email: [email protected] ³Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg University, 9100 Aalborg, Denmark; email: [email protected] ⁴Danish Nudging Network, 1208 København K, Denmark; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Public Health Vol. 37: 237 - 251

    • ...which is rooted in dual-process theories of cognition and information processing (32, 54...

  • Contributions to Defined Contribution Pension Plans

    James J. Choi ^{1,2 1}School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8200; email: [email protected] ²National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

    Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 7: 161 - 178

    • ...a default may serve as an anchor (Tversky & Kahneman 1974)....

  • Organizational Routines as Patterns of Action: Implications for Organizational Behavior

    Brian T. Pentland ¹ and Thorvald Hærem ^{2 1}Eli Broad College of Business, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824; email: [email protected] ²Department of Leadership and Organizational Behaviour, BI Norwegian Business School, NO-0442 Oslo, Norway; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior Vol. 2: 465 - 487

    • ...in traditional decision-making research (e.g., Gigerenzer 2000, Kahneman & Klein 2009, Tversky & Kahneman 1974, Whyte 1989), ...
    • ...one's own past actions may be both more available and more representative (Tversky & Kahneman 1973, 1974)....

  • Causality in Thought

    Steven A. Sloman ¹ and David Lagnado ^{2 1}Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912; email: [email protected] ²Cognitive, Perceptual, and Brain Sciences Department, University College London, WC1E 6BT United Kingdom; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 66: 223 - 247

    • ...Greater facility with causal than diagnostic reasoning has been found elsewhere. Tversky & Kahneman (1974)...
    • ...These asymmetries seem to reflect a system that is biased to reason from cause to effect rather than effect to cause. Tversky & Kahneman (1974) suggested that people are able to run mental simulations from cause to effect, ...

  • Social Attributions from Faces: Determinants, Consequences, Accuracy, and Functional Significance

    Alexander Todorov, ¹ Christopher Y. Olivola, ² Ron Dotsch, ³ and Peter Mende-Siedlecki ^{1 1}Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08540; email: [email protected] ²Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213³Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University, 6525 HR Nijmegen, The Netherlands

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 66: 519 - 545

    • ...and this may be another kind of judgmental illusion (Kahneman 2003, Tversky & Kahneman 1974)....

  • Information Processing as a Paradigm for Decision Making

    Daniel M. Oppenheimer and Evan KelsoAnderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90077; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 66: 277 - 294

    • ...decision making algorithms known as heuristics (e.g., Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier 2011, Tversky & Kahneman 1974)....

  • Consumer Acceptance of New Food Technologies: Causes and Roots of Controversies

    Jayson L. Lusk, ¹ Jutta Roosen, ² and Andrea Bieberstein ^{2 1}Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma 74078²TUM School of Management, Technische Universität München, 85350 Freising-Weihenstephan, Germany; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 6: 381 - 405

    • ...The behavioral economic work by Tversky & Kahneman (1974) was instrumental in the development of a theory of risk perception....
    • ...One of the key insights of behavioral economics is that subjective probability judgments often deviate from objective probabilities. Tversky & Kahneman (1974) argue that humans use heuristics to judge probabilities in order to reduce complexity....

  • The Psychology of Environmental Decisions

    Ben R. Newell, ¹ Rachel I. McDonald, ^1,2 Marilynn Brewer, ¹ and Brett K. Hayes ^{1 1}School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney 2052, Australia; email: [email protected] ²Department of Psychology, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66045

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 39: 443 - 467

    • ...Such an account also needs to acknowledge our tendency to be susceptible to cognitive biases and to rely on simplifying heuristics (13–15)....

  • Law, Environment, and the "Nondismal" Social Sciences

    William Boyd, ¹ Douglas A. Kysar, ² and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ^{3 1}University of Colorado Law School, Boulder, Colorado 80309; email: [email protected] ²Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut 06511; email: [email protected] ³Cornell University Law School, Ithaca, New York 14853; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Law and Social Science Vol. 8: 183 - 211

    • ...people tend to approach complex problems such as risk regulation using simple ways of thinking, known as heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman 1974)....
    • ...they assess how easy it is to call to mind instances of the occurrence (Tversky & Kahneman 1974)....
    • ...Tversky & Kahneman (1974) asked subjects to read lists of male and female names, ...
    • ...most people guess that there are more words in the English language that begin with the letter "k" than have "k" in the third position—even though there are far more of the latter (Tversky & Kahneman 1974)....
    • ...Tversky & Kahneman (1974) argued that heuristics are useful but prone to being used in the wrong settings, ...

  • Behavioral Economics and Psychology of Incentives

    Emir KamenicaBooth School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 4: 427 - 452

    • ...decisions can be influenced by numerical anchors even when those are explicitly randomized (Tversky & Kahneman 1974)....

  • The Methods of Comparative Effectiveness Research

    Harold C. Sox ¹ and Steven N. Goodman ^{2 1}Department of Medicine, The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice, Dartmouth Medical School, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755; email: [email protected] ²Department of Medicine and Health Research and Policy, Stanford University School of Medicine, Palo Alto, California 94305; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Public Health Vol. 33: 425 - 445

    • ...Subjective estimates of probability are subject to systematic errors (74)....
    • ...frequentist probability best applies to an individual as a starting point for subjective estimates based on the characteristics of the individual (74)....

  • The Rise and Fall of Job Analysis and the Future of Work Analysis

    Juan I. Sanchez ¹ and Edward L. Levine ^{2 1}Department of Management and International Business, Florida International University, Miami, Florida 33199; email: [email protected] ²Psychology Department, University of South Florida, Tampa, Florida 33620; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 63: 397 - 425

    • ... found that a rater training program intended to reduce the presumptively biasing effect of Tversky & Kahneman's (1974) representativeness and availability heuristics increased interrater agreement as long as the number of ratings was low to moderate....

  • Momentum

    Narasimhan Jegadeesh ¹ and Sheridan Titman ^{2 , 3 1}Goizueta Business School, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia 30322; email: [email protected] ²Finance Department, University of Texas, Austin, Texas 78712-1179; email: [email protected] ³National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

    Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 3: 493 - 509

    • ... hypothesize that investors identify patterns based on what Tversky & Kahneman (1974) refer to as a "representative heuristic," which is the tendency of individuals to identify "an uncertain event, ...

  • Heuristic Decision Making

    Gerd Gigerenzer and Wolfgang GaissmaierCenter for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, 14195 Berlin, Germany; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 62: 451 - 482

    • ...this opposition has been entrenched in psychological research, from the heuristics-and-biases program (Tversky & Kahneman 1974)...
    • ...whereas the content-free laws of logic and probability became identified with the principles of sound thinking (Kahneman 2003, Tversky & Kahneman 1974)....

  • Causal Learning and Inference as a Rational Process: The New Synthesis

    Keith J. Holyoak and Patricia W. ChengDepartment of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California 90095-1563; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 62: 135 - 163

    • ...Earlier work on causal inference had primarily adopted either a heuristic approach related to Tversky & Kahneman's (1973, Kahneman et al. 1982) work on decision making (e.g., ...

  • Questions in Decision Theory

    Itzhak GilboaEitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel, and HEC, Paris 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 2: 1 - 19

    • ...such as mistakes in Bayesian updating and framing effects (Tversky & Kahneman 1974, 1981)....

  • Energy Efficiency Economics and Policy

    Kenneth Gillingham, ¹ Richard G. Newell, ^{2 , 3 , 4 , *} and Karen Palmer ^{3 1}Precourt Energy Efficiency Center, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94309; email: [email protected] ²Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708; email: [email protected] ³Resources for the Future, Washington, D.C. 20036; email: [email protected] ⁴National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 1: 597 - 620

    • ...beginning with the research by Tversky & Kahneman indicating that both sophisticated and naïve respondents will consistently violate axioms of rational choice in certain situations (e.g., see Tversky & Kahneman 1974, Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • Health Psychology: The Search for Pathways between Behavior and Health

    Howard Leventhal, ¹ John Weinman, ² Elaine A. Leventhal, ¹ and L. Alison Phillips ^{1 1}Institute for Health, Health Care Policy and Aging Research, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08901-1293;²Health Psychology Section, Psychology Department, Institute of Psychiatry, King's College London, London SE1 9RT, United Kingdom; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 59: 477 - 505

    • ...which are factors related to limitations in processing capacity (Tversky & Kahneman 1974)....

  • Cognition in Organizations

    Gerard P. Hodgkinson and Mark P. HealeyLeeds University Business School, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, United Kingdom; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 59: 387 - 417

    • ...Tversky & Kahneman 1974) have been shown to influence judgment and choice in a range of personnel and organizational decision processes....

  • Models of Decision Making and Residential Energy Use

    Charlie Wilson and Hadi DowlatabadiInstitute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 32: 169 - 203

    • ...individuals also tend to "anchor" on certain types of information, rather than search for and process all relevant information (41, 42)....

  • Partitioning the Domain of Social Inference: Dual Mode and Systems Models and Their Alternatives

    Arie W. Kruglanski and Edward OrehekDepartment of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742-4411; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 58: 291 - 316

    • ...Tversky & Kahneman 1974) was often juxtaposed to the use of statistical rules (e.g., ...
    • ... obtained evidence that the well-known phenomenon of base-rate neglect (Kahneman 2003, Tversky & Kahneman 1974) can be partially accounted for by the interaction of difficulty of processing and the availability of processing resources....

  • IMAGING VALUATION MODELS IN HUMAN CHOICE

    P. Read Montague, ^1,2 Brooks King-Casas, ¹ and Jonathan D. Cohen ^{3 1}Department of Neuroscience, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas 77030²Menninger Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas 77030³Department of Psychology, Center for the Study of Brain, Mind, and Behavior, Green Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544

    Annual Review of Neuroscience Vol. 29: 417 - 448

  • PROSPECT THEORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

    Jonathan MercerDepartment of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195-3530; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 8: 1 - 21

    • ...we solve complex inference problems by relying on a variety of heuristics—cognitive shortcuts that systematically bias our judgments. Tversky & Kahneman (1974) identify three heuristics as especially important....
    • ...which in turn can explain why someone will put himself into a domain of gain or loss (Tversky & Kahneman 1974)....

  • Clinical Judgment and Decision Making

    Howard N. GarbWilford Hall Medical Center, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas 78236-5300; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Clinical Psychology Vol. 1: 67 - 89

    • ...Cognitive heuristics and biases, as formulated by Tversky & Kahneman (1974), ...

  • New Risks for Workers: Pensions, Labor Markets, and Gender

    Kim M. Shuey ¹ andAngela M. O'Rand ^{2 1}Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27516-2524; email: [email protected] ²Department of Sociology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 30: 453 - 477

    • ... introduced a foundation for a sociology of risk in the Annual Review of Sociology that summarized and extended two traditions: (a) the experimental studies of perceptions of risk traceable to a body of work associated primarily with the behavioral economics and cognitive psychology of Tversky and Kahneman (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1974, 1981), ...

  • The Economic Sociology of Conventions: Habit, Custom, Practice, and Routine in Market Order

    Nicole Woolsey Biggart¹ and Thomas D. Beamish^{2 1}Graduate School of Management and Department of Sociology, University of California, Davis, California 95616; email: [email protected] ²Department of Sociology, University of California, Davis, California 95616; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 29: 443 - 464

    • ...Economists have turned to laboratory experiments conducted by psychologists (see Tversky & Kahenman 1974, 1986, Tversky et al. 1990)...
    • ...cognitive psychologists have demonstrated that the mind selectively filters and categorizes information through the use of mental models of various types (Fischhoff 1990, Kahenman & Tversky 2000, Slovic et al. 1979, Tversky & Kahenman 1974)....

  • HERBERT A. SIMON: Political Scientist

    Jonathan BendorGraduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 6: 433 - 471

    • ...Here belongs the Tversky-Kahneman (T-K) research tradition on heuristics and biases (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1974...

  • What Can History Teach Us? A Retrospective Examination of Long-Term Energy Forecasts for the United States

    Paul P. Craig,¹ Ashok Gadgil,² and Jonathan G. Koomey^{3 1}Sierra Club Global Warming and Energy Program, 623 Lafayette Street, Martinez, California 94553; e-mail: [email protected] ²Indoor Environment Department, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 1 Cyclotron Road, MS 90-3058, Berkeley, California 94720; e-mail: [email protected] ³End Use Forecasting Group, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 1 Cyclotron Road, MS 90-4000, Berkeley, California 94720; e-mail: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Energy and the Environment Vol. 27: 83 - 118

    • ...people tend to be more risk-averse in situation in which they stand to lose a lot than in a situation in which they stand to gain a lot (48, 49, 50, 51)....
    • ...The way in which the results are framed can be enormously important to a study's credibility and influence (48, 49, 50, 51, 75)....

  • Rationality

    Eldar Shafir and Robyn A. LeBoeufDepartment of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544; e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 53: 491 - 517

    • ... notions of bounded rationality and later by Kahneman and Tversky's heuristics and biases program (Kahneman & Tversky 1972, 1973, Tversky & Kahneman 1973, 1974, 1983), ...

  • Problems for Judgment and Decision Making

    R. HastiePsychology Department, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0345; e-mail: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 52: 653 - 683

    • ...the beliefs and corresponding behavior must be irrational (Dawes 2000, Tversky & Kahneman 1974)....
    • ...Another is the sudden popularity of cognitive heuristics models for judgment (Tversky & Kahneman 1974)...

  • Commensuration as a Social Process

    Wendy Nelson EspelandDepartment of Sociology, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208-1330; e-mail: [email protected] Mitchell L. StevensDepartment of Sociology, Hamilton College, Clinton, New York 13323; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 24: 313 - 343

    • ...; so too has our growing appreciation of people's cognitive limitations (Tversky & Kahneman 1974, 1981;, Thaler 1983...

  • JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING

    B. A. Mellers¹, A. Schwartz², and A. D. J. Cooke^{3 1}Department of Psychology, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210, e-mail: [email protected] ;²Department of Medical Education, University of Illinois, Chicago, Illinois 60612-7309; ³Marketing Department, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 49: 447 - 477

    • ...and random sampling promote base-rate usage (Cosmides & Tooby 1996, Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995, Tversky & Kahneman 1974, Weber et al 1993)...

• 144.

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    Moses ShayoDepartment of Economics and Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 9190501 Jerusalem, Israel; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 12: 355 - 389

    • ...Drawing on Tversky & Kahneman's (1983) representativeness heuristic, Bordalo et al. (2016)...

  • Treatment Selection in Depression

    Zachary D. Cohen and Robert J. DeRubeisDepartment of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Clinical Psychology Vol. 14: 209 - 236

    • ...the lack of standardization that defines artisanal medicine limits the validity and utility of such approaches for decision making (Dawes 1979, 2005; Dawes et al. 1989; Tversky & Kahneman 1983)....

  • Culture Three Ways: Culture and Subcultures Within Countries

    Daphna OysermanDepartment of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089-1061; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 68: 435 - 463

    • ...its products have been called natural assessments (Tversky & Kahneman 1983) that are immediately available as bases for choice and action....

  • Vagueness and Imprecision: Empirical Foundations

    Stephanie SoltZAS (Centre for General Linguistics), 10117 Berlin, Germany; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Linguistics Vol. 1: 107 - 127

    • ...or at least not like classical logicians (Tversky & Kahneman 1983); here we observe that they do not interpret language like classical logicians either....

  • Law, Environment, and the "Nondismal" Social Sciences

    William Boyd, ¹ Douglas A. Kysar, ² and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ^{3 1}University of Colorado Law School, Boulder, Colorado 80309; email: [email protected] ²Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut 06511; email: [email protected] ³Cornell University Law School, Ithaca, New York 14853; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Law and Social Science Vol. 8: 183 - 211

    • ...people estimated that the text in a passage they just read contained more words ending with "ing" than with "n" in the penultimate position (Tversky & Kahneman 1983)....

  • Morality in the Law: The Psychological Foundations of Citizens' Desires to Punish Transgressions

    John M. DarleyDepartment of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08540; email: [email protected]

    

    Annual Review of Law and Social Science Vol. 5: 1 - 23

    • ...Some attributes, which Tversky & Kahneman (1983) called natural assessments, are routinely and automatically registered by the perceptual system or by [system 1 (this is the intuitive system)] without intention or effort…....

• 145.

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  • Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and Agricultural Extension in Developing Countries

    David Spielman, ¹ Els Lecoutere, ² Simrin Makhija, ³ and Bjorn Van Campenhout ^{4,5 1}Development Strategy and Governance Division, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Kigali, Rwanda; email: [email protected] ²Development Economics Group, Wageningen University, 6700 HB Wageningen, The Netherlands; email: [email protected] ³Environment and Production Technology Division, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, DC 20005, USA; email: [email protected] ⁴Development Strategy and Governance Division, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, DC 20005, USA; email: [email protected] ⁵LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 13: 177 - 201

    • ...and anthropology to look beyond the standard rational expectations model (see, inter alia, Tversky & Kahneman 1992, 1973)....

  • A Perspective on Incentive Design: Challenges and Opportunities

    Lillian J. Ratliff, ¹ Roy Dong, ² Shreyas Sekar, ¹ and Tanner Fiez ^{1 1}Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195, USA; email: [email protected] ²Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois 61801, USA

    Annual Review of Control, Robotics, and Autonomous Systems Vol. 2: 305 - 338

    • ...Such nonlinear utilities are a core component of the famed prospect theory (89, 91)....

  • Anxiety, Depression, and Decision Making: A Computational Perspective

    Sonia J. Bishop ^1,2 and Christopher Gagne ^{1 1}Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720, USA; email: [email protected] ²Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720, USA

    Annual Review of Neuroscience Vol. 41: 371 - 388

    • ...It is well established that many individuals weight potential losses more than potential gains (Tversky & Kahneman 1992; for a review, ...

  • Index Insurance for Developing Country Agriculture: A Reassessment

    Michael Carter, ¹ Alain de Janvry, ² Elisabeth Sadoulet, ² and Alexandros Sarris ^{3 1}Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis, California 95616; email: [email protected] ²Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720; email: [email protected], [email protected] ³Department of Economics, University of Athens, 10559 Athens, Greece; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 9: 421 - 438

    • ...Under prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1992), individuals have an aversion to ambiguity in that they prefer gambles with known odds over those with unknown odds....

  • Decision-Making Processes in Social Contexts

    Elizabeth Bruch ¹ and Fred Feinberg ^{2 1}Department of Sociology and Complex Systems, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104; email: [email protected] ²Ross School of Business and Department of Statistics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 43: 207 - 227

    • ...From Daniel Kahneman's 2002 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for his work on heuristics and biases (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky & Kahneman 1981, 1992), ...

  • Behavioral Finance

    David HirshleiferMerage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, California 92697; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 7: 133 - 159

    • ...5.6.2. Prospect theory.Reference dependence and loss aversion are ingredients in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1992), ...

  • Dynamics, Viability, and Resilience in Bioeconomics

    Jean-Paul ChavasDepartment of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 7: 209 - 231

    • ...Nonexpected utility models have been proposed to deal with this issue (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1992, Quiggin 1993)....

  • Experiments in International Relations: Lab, Survey, and Field

    Susan D. HydeDepartment of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 18: 403 - 424

    • ...One of the clearest areas in which IR theory has already been strongly influenced by experimental findings from the lab is prospect theory (Boettcher 1995, 2004; Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Levy 1997; McDermott 2004; Tversky & Kahneman 1992)....

  • Information Processing as a Paradigm for Decision Making

    Daniel M. Oppenheimer and Evan KelsoAnderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90077; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 66: 277 - 294

    • ...Further anomalies in people's perceptions of probability led to the development of cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1992), ...
    • ...Instead, LCA assumes loss aversion (cf. Tversky & Kahneman 1992)....

  • Optimal Design of Funded Pension Schemes

    Lans Bovenberg and Roel MehlkopfTilburg University and Netspar, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands; email: [email protected], r.j. [email protected] edu

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 6: 445 - 474

    • ...suggests that human behavior is not always well described by twice differentiable concave utility functions. Tversky & Kahneman (1992) therefore develop prospect theory to better describe human behavior with respect to risk....
    • ...Tversky & Kahneman (1992) find that losses tend to weigh approximately 2 1/4 times more heavily than gains....

  • Probability and Risk: Foundations and Economic Implications of Probability-Dependent Risk Preferences

    Helga Fehr-Duda ¹ and Thomas Epper ^{1 , 2 1}Institute for Environmental Decisions, ETH Zürich, 8092 Zürich, Switzerland; email: [email protected] ²Department of Economics, University of Zürich, 8006 Zürich, Switzerland; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 4: 567 - 593

    • ...the most common shapes being inverse S and convex curves (Tversky & Kahneman 1992, Gonzalez & Wu 1999, van de Kuilen & Wakker 2011)....
    • ...rule out a large number of nonexpected utility models and reduce the list to two types of tractable models: rank-dependent models (Quiggin 1982, Tversky & Kahneman 1992)...
    • ...Tversky & Kahneman (1992) propose a parametric specification of loss aversion with respect to a fixed outcome that has since become the gold standard of many estimates of prospect theory parameters and calibrations.⁵ In our experience, ...
    • ...Tversky-Kahneman.This function is inverse S-shaped and has become extremely popular:10with 0.279 < γ < 1 (Tversky & Kahneman 1992)....
    • ..., the psychophysics of perception (Tversky & Kahneman 1992, Wakker 2010), ...
    • ... ³Tversky & Kahneman (1992) argue that the utility function is concave for gains and convex for losses....
    • ... ⁵Since the publication of Tversky & Kahneman (1992), any estimates of loss aversion that deviate significantly from the value of two have been eyed with great suspicion, ...

  • Behavioral Economics and Environmental Policy

    Fredrik Carlsson and Olof Johansson-Stenman*Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, SE 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 4: 75 - 99

    • ...There is also a general pattern that people overestimate small probabilities and underestimate large probabilities ( Tversky & Kahneman 1992)....
    • ...According to Tversky & Kahneman (1992) and Gonzalez Wu (1999), a relationship as that shown in Figure 1 d is more realistic....

  • Questions in Decision Theory

    Itzhak GilboaEitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel, and HEC, Paris 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 2: 1 - 19

    • ... ⁶Only in Tversky & Kahneman (1992) did the authors also extend it to situations of uncertainty, ...

  • Mindful Judgment and Decision Making

    Elke U. Weber and Eric J. JohnsonCenter for the Decision Sciences (CDS), Columbia University, New York, New York 10027; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 60: 53 - 85

    • ...In cumulative PT (Tversky & Kahneman 1992), the subjective weight given to a given outcome no longer is simply a nonlinear transformation of its objective probability of occurring, ...

  • Models of Decision Making and Residential Energy Use

    Charlie Wilson and Hadi DowlatabadiInstitute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z4, Canada; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 32: 169 - 203

    • ...as do other violations of utility theory's axioms of preference (39)....

  • New Risks for Workers: Pensions, Labor Markets, and Gender

    Kim M. Shuey ¹ andAngela M. O'Rand ^{2 1}Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27516-2524; email: [email protected] ²Department of Sociology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 30: 453 - 477

    • ...Literature in the psychology of saving relies less on the life cycle of the household and the maintenance of consumption over the life course and focuses more on behavioral patterns derived from life experiences (Barsky et al. 1997; Bernheim 1991; Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky & Kahneman 1991, 1992)....

  • Human Research and Data Collection via the Internet

    Michael H. BirnbaumDepartment of Psychology, California State University, Fullerton, California 92834–6846; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 55: 803 - 832

    • ...indicating that cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1992) is not descriptive of risky decision-making....

  • EXPERIMENTAL METHODS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

    Rose McDermottDepartment of Government, McGraw Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14850; e-mail: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 5: 31 - 61

    • ...In attempting to develop a descriptively accurate model of choice as an alternative to expected utility models, Kahneman & Tversky (1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1992) delineated prospect theory....

  • Rationality

    Eldar Shafir and Robyn A. LeBoeufDepartment of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544; e-mail: [email protected] [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 53: 491 - 517

    • ...the most influential of which has been prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky & Kahneman 1992)....

  • Problems for Judgment and Decision Making

    R. HastiePsychology Department, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0345; e-mail: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 52: 653 - 683

    • ... for overviews of these developments; and see Tversky & Kahneman 1992 for the best-known formulation)....
    • ...traditional cognitive algebra (Anderson 1981, Birnbaum 1999), and measurement-theoretical algebra (Luce 2000, Tversky & Kahneman 1992)?...

  • JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING

    B. A. Mellers¹, A. Schwartz², and A. D. J. Cooke^{3 1}Department of Psychology, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210, e-mail: [email protected] ;²Department of Medical Education, University of Illinois, Chicago, Illinois 60612-7309; ³Marketing Department, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 49: 447 - 477

    • ...Tversky & Kahneman's (1992) cumulative prospect theory is another rank- and sign-dependent representation that is identical to rank- and sign-dependent theory in all but two respects....

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  • Climate Change Disinformation and How to Combat It

    Stephan LewandowskySchool of Psychological Science, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1TU, United Kingdom; email: [email protected]School of Psychological Science, University of Western Australia, Perth, Western Australia 6009, AustraliaOceans and Atmosphere, CSIRO, Hobart, Tasmania 7004, Australia

    Annual Review of Public Health Vol. 42: 1 - 21

    • ...and in many instances highlighting the 97% consensus has increased acceptance of climate science or increased policy support (38, 60, 91, 106, 160)....

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  • Game-Theoretic Approaches to Pragmatics

    Anton Benz ¹ and Jon Stevens ^{2 1}Leibniz-Centre General Linguistics (ZAS), Berlin 10117, Germany; email: [email protected] ²Department of Linguistics, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Linguistics Vol. 4: 173 - 191

    • ...Expected utility (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944) is the weighted average utility for all possible outcomes given what the player has observed so far....

  • Offender Decision-Making in Criminology: Contributions from Behavioral Economics

    Greg Pogarsky, ¹ Sean Patrick Roche, ² and Justin T. Pickett ^{1 1}School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany-SUNY, Albany, New York 12222, USA; email: [email protected] ²School of Criminal Justice, Texas State University, San Marcos, Texas 78666, USA

    Annual Review of Criminology Vol. 1: 379 - 400

    • ...In the mid-twentieth century, von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944; see also Savage 1954)...

  • The Psychology of Superorganisms: Collective Decision Making by Insect Societies

    Takao Sasaki ¹ and Stephen C. Pratt ^{2, 1}Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3PS, United Kingdom; email: [email protected] ²School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287, USA; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Entomology Vol. 63: 259 - 275

    • ...meaning that they act to maximize utility, an implicit measure of benefit or value (137)....

  • Persuasion, Influence, and Value: Perspectives from Communication and Social Neuroscience

    Emily Falk ^1,2,3 and Christin Scholz ^{1 1}Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104; email: [email protected], [email protected] ²Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104³Marketing Department, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 69: 329 - 356

    • ...which are central to a broad set of economic theories (Samuelson 1937, Savage 1954, Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944)....

  • Machine Translation: Mining Text for Social Theory

    James A. Evans and Pedro AcevesDepartment of Sociology, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 42: 21 - 50

    • ...ends-oriented competition as in game theory (Myerson 2013, von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944)....

  • The Axiomatic Approach to Risk Measures for Capital Determination

    Hans Föllmer ¹ and Stefan Weber ^{2 1}Institut für Mathematik, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 10099 Berlin, Germany; email: [email protected] ²Institut für Mathematische Stochastik, Leibniz Universität Hannover, 30167 Hannover, Germany; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Financial Economics Vol. 7: 301 - 337

    • ...If preferences satisfy the classical axioms of rationality formulated by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944)...
    • ...The classical axioms of rationality as formulated by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944)...

  • Information Processing as a Paradigm for Decision Making

    Daniel M. Oppenheimer and Evan KelsoAnderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90077; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 66: 277 - 294

  • Neural Basis of Reinforcement Learning and Decision Making

    Daeyeol Lee, ^1,2 Hyojung Seo, ¹ and Min Whan Jung ^{3 1}Department of Neurobiology, Kavli Institute for Neuroscience, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, Connecticut 06510; email: [email protected], [email protected] ²Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520³Neuroscience Laboratory, Institute for Medical Sciences, Ajou University School of Medicine, Suwon 443-721, Republic of Korea; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Neuroscience Vol. 35: 287 - 308

    • ...Such theories, including expected utility theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944), ...
    • ...Such strategic situations are referred to as games (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944)....

  • The Methods of Comparative Effectiveness Research

    Harold C. Sox ¹ and Steven N. Goodman ^{2 1}Department of Medicine, The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice, Dartmouth Medical School, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755; email: [email protected] ²Department of Medicine and Health Research and Policy, Stanford University School of Medicine, Palo Alto, California 94305; email: [email protected]du

    Annual Review of Public Health Vol. 33: 425 - 445

    • ...Von Neumann & Morgenstern in Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (78) showed that the patient should prefer the decision option with the highest expected utility to be consistent with his preferences for the health states that he might experience....

  • Transportation and the Environment

    David Banister, Karen Anderton, David Bonilla, Moshe Givoni, and Tim SchwanenTransport Studies Unit, School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 3QY, United Kingdom; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 36: 247 - 270

    • ...The current public policy framework for decarbonization is highly reliant on rational decision theory (82) and on expected utility theory (83), ...

  • Behavior, Robustness, and Sufficient Statistics in Welfare Measurement

    Richard E. JustDepartment of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 3: 37 - 70

    • ... as well as more sophisticated behavioral departures from profit maximization under risk aversion (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, Kahneman & Tversky 1979)....

  • Questions in Decision Theory

    Itzhak GilboaEitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel, and HEC, Paris 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 2: 1 - 19

    • ...A decision theorist walks into the room and explains the von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM, 1944) theory to them....

  • Some Developments in Economic Theory Since 1940: An Eyewitness Account

    Kenneth J. ArrowDepartment of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Economics Vol. 1: 1 - 16

    • ...A large influence was the publication of von Neumann & Morgenstern's (1944) great work on game theory....

  • Quality-Based Financial Incentives in Health Care: Can We Improve Quality by Paying for It?

    Douglas A. Conrad ¹ and Lisa Perry ^{2 1}Department of Health Services, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195; email: [email protected] ²Department of Economics, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Public Health Vol. 30: 357 - 371

    • ...with important contributions from behavioral economics (49, 76, 77), the theory of principal-agent behavior (13, 26, 29, 33, 47, 48, 64, 78), ...
    • ...The logic is based on risk aversion, or, equivalently, diminishing marginal utility of income (3, 78), ...
    • ...Individual physicians will seek to maximize their own expected utility (78); that is, ...

  • Coalitions

    Macartan HumphreysDepartment of Political Science, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 11: 351 - 386

    • ...This is what von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) call "the crucial problem" in modeling games and economic behavior....
    • ...Closed membership.In an alternative model (game Γ) studied by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944)...

  • Neuroeconomics

    George Loewenstein, ¹ Scott Rick, ² and Jonathan D. Cohen ^{3 1}Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213,²Department of Operations and Information Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104,³Department of Psychology, Center for the Study of Brain, Mind and Behavior, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08540, and Department of Psychiatry, Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260; email: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 59: 647 - 672

    • ...Although the model seems superficially plausible and can be derived from a set of seemingly sensible axioms (von NEUmann & Morgenstern 1944), ...

  • Overview: Sixty Years in Anthropology

    Fredrik BarthRødkleivfaret 16, 0788 Oslo, Norway

    

    Annual Review of Anthropology Vol. 36: 1 - 16

    • ...In the library I came across von Neumann & Morgenstern's volume on the Theory of Games (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944) and was intrigued to find that their simple model of a multiperson game of alliance favored the formation of just such a pervasive two-party coalition....

  • IMAGING VALUATION MODELS IN HUMAN CHOICE

    P. Read Montague, ^1,2 Brooks King-Casas, ¹ and Jonathan D. Cohen ^{3 1}Department of Neuroscience, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas 77030²Menninger Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas 77030³Department of Psychology, Center for the Study of Brain, Mind, and Behavior, Green Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08544

    Annual Review of Neuroscience Vol. 29: 417 - 448

    • ...the lack of good neural probes in humans forced most of the early work on human choice into the theoretical domain (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, Bush & Mosteller 1955, Simon 1955, Luce & Raiffa 1957)....

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  • Perceived Self-Efficacy, Poverty, and Economic Development

    David Wuepper ¹ and Travis J. Lybbert ^{2 1}Department of Agricultural Economics, Technical University Munich, 85354 Freising, Germany; email: [email protected] ²Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis, California 95616

    Annual Review of Resource Economics Vol. 9: 383 - 404

    • ...This also connects PSE to domain-specific risk attitudes (Nicholson et al. 2005, Weber et al. 2002)....

  • Mindful Judgment and Decision Making

    Elke U. Weber and Eric J. JohnsonCenter for the Decision Sciences (CDS), Columbia University, New York, New York 10027; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Psychology Vol. 60: 53 - 85

    • ...perceived risk is less predicted by analytic considerations (such as expected volatility as a function of past volatility) and more by affective reactions related to familiarity with the choice option (a domestic stock with high name recognition) (Weber et al. 2005b) or decision domain (Weber et al. 2002)....
    • ...payoff sensitivity as well as health and social risk taking as measured by a recent domain-specific risk-taking scale (Weber et al. 2002)...
    • ...women perceive the riskiness of choice options to be larger in most domains (all but social risk; see Weber et al. 2002) rather than having a more averse attitude toward risk as they perceive it....
    • ...as well as Zuckerman & Kuhlman (2000) and Weber et al. (2002), ...

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  • Urgent Decision Making: Resolving Visuomotor Interactions at High Temporal Resolution

    Terrence R. Stanford and Emilio SalinasDepartment of Neurobiology & Anatomy, Wake Forest School of Medicine, Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27157, USA; email: [email protected], [email protected]

    Annual Review of Vision Science Vol. 7: 323 - 348

    • ...The speed–accuracy tradeoff is a ubiquitous behavioral phenomenon whereby a subject can either respond slowly and make relatively few errors or respond quickly and make relatively more errors (Chitka et al. 2009, Salinas et al. 2014, Thura & Cisek 2016, Wickelgren 1977)....
    • ...promising proposal for fully characterizing perceptual performance independently of the tradeoff was to generate a function plotting accuracy versus RT (Wickelgren 1977)....
    • ...the speed–accuracy tradeoff implies that the information that they provide is highly intertwined (Wickelgren 1977)....

  • Visual Decision-Making in an Uncertain and Dynamic World

    Joshua I. Gold ¹ and Alan A. Stocker ^{2 1}Department of Neuroscience, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104; email: [email protected] ²Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104; email: [email protected]

    Annual Review of Vision Science Vol. 3: 227 - 250

    • ...This relationship between SNR and viewing time can account for the inherent trade-off between speed and accuracy that governs many visual (and other) decisions (Schouten & Bekker 1967, Wickelgren 1977)....
    • ...is that the bound can be adjusted to mediate the trade-off between speed and accuracy that is inherent to many decisions (Barnard 1946, Wald 1947, Schouten & Bekker 1967, Wickelgren 1977, Gold & Shadlen 2002)....

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  • Climate Risk Management

    Klaus Keller, ^1,2 Casey Helgeson, ² and Vivek Srikrishnan ^{2,3 1}Department of Geosciences, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802, USA; email: [email protected] ²Earth and Environmental Systems Institute, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802, USA³Department of Biological and Environmental Engineering, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853, USA

    Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences Vol. 49: 95 - 116

    • ...the impacts of decision support tools and climate hazard information on decisions are complex and require evaluation (Budescu et al. 2014, Clar & Steurer 2018, Wong-Parodi et al. 2016)....
    • ...often neglected (Clar & Steurer 2018, Morgan et al. 2002, Vaughan et al. 2018, Wong-Parodi et al. 2016)....
    • ...There is a large body of literature on how to design such a process (Field et al. 2014, Haasnoot et al. 2013, Kates et al. 2012, Lempert et al. 2003, McDaniels & Gregory 2004, McDaniels et al. 1999, Moallemi et al. 2019, Moser et al. 2012, Natl. Res. Counc. 1999, Renn 1999, Wong-Parodi et al. 2016)....

  • Toward the Next Generation of Assessment

    Katharine J. Mach ¹ and Christopher B. Field ^{2 1}Department of Earth System Science, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305; email: [email protected] ²Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305

    Annual Review of Environment and Resources Vol. 42: 569 - 597

    • ...can help ensure that substantial investments in developing rigorous expert judgments translate into useful messages (e.g., 42, 64, 87, 88)....
    • ...such as through focus testing, surveys, web-based forums, or interactive sessions (87...
    • ...and decision-science specialists as contributing experts; prioritize capacity building across author teams; or incorporate traditional and indigenous knowledge in framing and shaping assessment (11, 42, 84, 86, 88, 89, 129, 130)....
    • ...5.2.2. The products.Iterative decision-maker inputs and coproduction can foster assessment that connects with reality (38, 42, 88)....
    • ...inputs from communications specialists and iterative development advance assessment that works (Figure 6; see also 42, 88, 89, 106). ...
    • ...User knowledge, preferences, and active mastery were evaluated through online surveys (64, 88)....
    • ...Images adapted from Reference 88, with permission....
    • ...Designing and deploying effective outreach approaches necessitates early and deep engagement of relevant communications and decision-science professionals (42, 86, 88, 89, 130, 133)....

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